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THE "PRIORITY STATUTE" - THE UNITED

STATES' "ACE-IN-THE-HOLE"t
RICHARD H.W. MALOY"

INTRODUCTION

There has been a statute in effect, since 1797, which is so
arcane that in a recent case neither the attorney for the
government, nor the private party, were aware of its existence
until they were informed by the Department of Justice.1 The
statute at issue was 31 U.S.C. § 3713,2 popularly labeled the
"Priority Statute."3 It is surprising that this statute is known by

t Phrase & Word Origins, http://www.yaelf.com/questions.shtml (last
visited July 27, 2006) ("In certain games of poker, some cards are dealt in such
a manner that they are not visible to the other players, and the slang
expression for these cards is 'the hole.' Having an 'ace' (a high card) in 'the
Hole' can provide one with a decisive advantage when the cards are finally
revealed.").
Visiting Professor of Law, St. Thomas School of Law,
Miami, Florida.
The author wishes to thank Jennifer Wioncek, a St. Thomas 3L, for her help in
the preparation of this article, and Ned Swanner, Head of Public Services and
Robert Hudson, Faculty Services Librarian, St. Thomas Law School for their
retrieval of the old statutes referred to in this article.
1. See United States v. Mountzoures, 376 F. Supp. 2d 13, 16 (D. Mass.
2005) (conceding that neither defendant nor the Bureau of Prisons knew of the
priority statute until the Department of Justice informed them).
2. 31 U.S.C. § 3713 (2000).
3. See S.E.C. v. Credit Bancorp, Ltd., 297 F.3d 127, 131 (2d Cir. 2002)
(referring to § 3713 as "The Federal Debt Priority Statute."); Green Atlas
Shipping v. United States, 306 F. Supp. 2d 974, 975 (D. Or. 2003) (same). The
Priority Statute is not to be confused with the "absolute priority rule" of
bankruptcy law. Under bankruptcy law, if a class of unsecured claims is not
being paid in full under a reorganization plan, the plan will not be considered
"fair and equitable" unless, among other matters, the holder of any junior
interest "will not receive or retain under the plan on account of such
junior... interest any property...." 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii) (2000). In
other words, the Bankruptcy Code provides that, if a reorganization plan is
objected to by a class of unsecured claimants because such claims are not
being paid in full, the plan will only pass the "fair and equitable" test required
for confirmation if classes junior to the objecting class receive nothing on their
claims. See Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Sav. Ass'n v. 203 N. Lasalle St. P'ship,
526 U.S. 434, 441-42 (1999). The same protection is provided to classes of
equity security holders (i.e. stockholders and partners) 11 U.S.C.
1129(b)(2)(C)(ii) (2005).
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so few when one realizes the United States Supreme Court has
interpreted it forty-eight times;4 although, admittedly, one-third of
that number were decided in the Nineteenth Century.
In my Debtor/Creditor Relations class we usually spend a day
discussing the Priority Statute. Since there has not been an
article written about this interesting, esoteric statute in many
years, I decided it was about time to publicize it.5 This article will
explore
the Priority Statute by tracing its historical
underpinnings; discuss Supreme Court decisions that have
interpreted it; and, finally, the Conclusion will formulate the rules
that the decisions have promulgated.
I.

THE PRIORITY STATUTE

The Priority Statute is codified at 31 U.S.C. § 3713.
entirety the statute provides:

In its

(a) (1) A claim of the United States Government shall be paid first
when (A) a person indebted to the Government is insolvent and (i) the debtor without enough property to pay all debts
makes a voluntary assignment of property;
(ii) property of the debtor, if absent, is attached; or
(iii) an act of bankruptcy is committed; or

At this point, it should be noted that this paper is not concerned with 31
U.S.C. § 9309, which deals with governmental priority in connection with
surety bonds.
4. It is even more surprising, after realizing the opinions in these fortyeight decisions have been authored by several eminent jurists.
5. It is certainly an important, if little known, portion of our
jurisprudence.
6. The Bankruptcy Act of 1898 identified "acts of bankruptcy" as follows:
Acts of bankruptcy by a person shall consist of his having (1) conveyed,
transferred, concealed, or removed, or permitted to be concealed or
removed, any part of his property with intent to hinder, delay or defraud
his creditors, or any of them; or (2) transferred, while insolvent, any
portion of his property to one or more of his creditors with intent to
prefer such creditors over his other creditors; or (3) suffered or
permitted, while insolvent, any creditor to obtain a preference through
legal proceedings, and not having at least five days before a sale or final
disposition of any property affected by such preference vacated or
discharged such preference; or (4) made a general assignment for the
benefit of his creditors; or (5) admitted in writing his inability to pay his
debts and his willingness to be adjudged a bankrupt on that ground.
Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, 30 stat. 544 (repealed 1978). In re Tenn.
Cent. Ry., Co., 463 F2d 73, 77 (6th Cir. 1972), and United States v. Schroeder,
204 F. Supp. 199, 202 (S.D. Iowa 1962), refer to the statute, but do not quote
it.
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(B) the estate of a deceased debtor, in the custody of the
executor or administrator, is not enough to pay all debts of the
debtor.
(2) This subsection does not apply to a case under title 11,7
(b) A representative of a person or an estate (except a trustee acting
under title 11) paying any part of a debt of the person or estate
before paying a claim of the Government is liable to the extent of the
payment for unpaid claims of the Government.8
In summary, in order for a claim in favor of the United States
against a "person"9 to have unsecured first priority three
prerequisites must be established: (1) the debtor must have been
insolvent at the time the person owed the debt;"° (2) at least one of

As of 1976, the Bankruptcy Act defined "acts of bankruptcy" as follows:
Acts of bankruptcy by a person shall consist of his having (1) concealed,
removed, or permitted to be concealed or removed any part of his
property, with intent to hinder, delay, or defraud his creditors or any of
them, or made or suffered a transfer of any of his property, fraudulent
under the provisions of section 107 or 110 of this title; or (2) made or
suffered a preferential transfer, as defined in subdivision (a) of section
96 of this title; or (3) suffered or permitted, while insolvent, any creditor
to obtain a lien upon any of his property through legal proceedings or
distraint and not having vacated or discharged such lien within thirty
days from the date thereof or at least five days before the date set for
any sale or disposition of such property; or (4) made a general
assignment for the benefit of his creditors; or (5) while insolvent or
unable to pay his debts as they mature, procured, permitted, or suffered
voluntarily or involuntarily the appointment of a receiver or trustee to
take charge of his property; or (6) admitted in writing his inability to
pay his debts and his willingness to be adjudged a bankrupt.
11 U.S.C. § 21(a) (1976) (repealed 1978); see also Community Progress, Inc. v.
White, 444 A.2d 1369, 1374 n.6 (Conn. 1982) (quoting the repealed statute).
The Bankruptcy Act of 1800 specified ten "acts of bankruptcy", the Act of 1841
specified five such acts, and the Act of 1867 specified nine acts. In re
Marshall, 300 B.R. 507, 518 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2003). See infra notes 229, 288,
651 and 656 (discussing In re Marshall).
7. The wording of this subsection of the Priority Statute was added to the
statute in 1978, as part of the major revamping of the Bankruptcy system
under the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978,
Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 322(b), 92 Stat. 2549, 2679; see also United States v.
Estate of Romani, 523 U.S. 517, 531 n.15 (1998). The Bankruptcy Reform Act
of 1978 became effective October 1, 1979. § 402(a), 92 Stat. at 2682. See infra
notes 623-649 and accompanying text for a discussion of Estate of Romani.
8. The wording of this subsection was added to the statute by the Act of
1799. Price v. United States, 269 U.S. 492, 501 (1926); see also infra notes
289-298 and accompanying text for a discussion of Price.
9. A corporation is a "person." See Beaston v. Farmers' Bank of Del., 37
U.S. 102, 134-35 (1838) ("The record in this case abundantly proves, that a
bank may become largely indebted to the United States..

. .").

See also infra

notes 153-178 and accompanying text for a discussion of Beaston.
10. See United States v. Vermont, 377 U.S. 351, 358 (1964); see also infra
notes 574-595 and accompanying text for a complete discussion of Vermont.
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the following events must have occurred: (a) the debtor without
enough property to pay all debts makes a voluntary assignment of
all of its property,1' (b) property of the debtor, if absent, is
attached, or (c) an act of bankruptcy is committed;" and (3) the
debtor must not be the subject of a bankruptcy case. In addition, if
the representative of such a debtor (except a trustee appointed
under the Bankruptcy Code) pays any part of a debt due to the
United States before paying the United States, that representative
will become personally liable to the extent of the payment for
unpaid claims of the United States.
In order for a claim in favor of the United States and against
"the estate of a deceased debtor" to have unsecured first priority,
three prerequisites must be established: (1) the estate must be in
the custody of an executor or administrator; (2) the estate is not
enough to pay all debts of the debtor; and (3) the estate must not
be the subject of a bankruptcy case.
Similarly, if the
representative of such a debtor's estate (except a trustee appointed
under the Bankruptcy Code) pays any part of a debt due to the
United States before paying the United States, the representative
will also become personally liable to the extent of payment for
unpaid claims of the United States.

11. By way of explanation, a voluntary assignment of all ones property was
known under the common law as an "assignment for the benefit of creditors"
(A.B.C.), which at one time was very popular among debtors as a way of
avoiding bankruptcy; and is still in use. Brecht v. Law Union & Crown Ins.,
Co., 153 F. 452, 455 (Cir. Ct. D. Or. 1907). See In re Myers' Assigned Estate,
47 Pa. C.C. 319 (Pa. Orph. 1918). The debtor assigns all, or substantially all,
of its property to a third person (usually called an assignee or trustee), whose
function is to work out a payment schedule with creditors. The debtor is
relieved of dealing with creditors for the very pragmatic reason that the debtor
has no more assets, and a judgment against the debtor would be of virtually no
value. The assignment often, but not necessarily, occurs while the debtor's
liabilities exceed its assets. See id.
12. The term "an act of bankruptcy" has a very precise meaning. Under the
previous Bankruptcy Act, effective prior to the Bankruptcy Reform Act of
1978, a person (individual or artificial) could not be forced into bankruptcy by
creditors unless an "act of bankruptcy" was committed. Bankruptcy Act of
1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544 (1898) (repealed 1978); see Bramwell v. U.S. Fid. &
Guar. Co., 269 U.S. 483, 489-90 (1926) (discussing "acts of bankruptcy"); see
also supra note 6, infra notes 261, 284, 286, 288, 448, 656-61, 734 and
accompanying text for further discussion of "acts of bankruptcy."
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THE U.S. CONGRESSIONAL HISTORY OF THE PRIORITY ACTS'"

The modern form of the Priority Statute is codified at 31
U.S.C. § 3713. Other priority statutes, however, were enacted
during our Congressional history. We are fortunate to have some
of the history of priority statutes chronicled for us by both Chief
Justice John Marshall in United States v. Fisher," and Justice
Joseph Story in United States v. State Bank of North Carolina.'5
Chief Justice Marshall recounted that in early English law the
King was given a preference in the collection of public monies. 6
Justice Story further reported that the right of priority "[was]
founded not so much upon any personal advantage to the
sovereign, as upon motives of public policy, in order to secure
adequate revenue to sustain the public burthens [sic] and
discharge the public debts."' Justice Story further commented by
stating that since this policy "has mainly a reference to the public
good, there is no reason for giving to [the statute] a strict and
narrow interpretation. Like all other statutes of this nature, they
ought to receive a fair and reasonable interpretation, according to
the just import of their terms."'8
The modern Priority Statute has been in effect since 1797
without material change. 9 The first statute giving the United
States priority in the payment of debts due to the United States
was the Act of July 31 1789,'" which permitted the posting of bonds
by importers in lieu of payment of duties for release of import

13. This article will focus only on federal Congressional history. Several
states, however, have enacted priority statutes. See Pauley v. California, 75
F.2d 120, 134 (9th Cir. 1934) (California law); People v. Farmers' State Bank
of Hooppole, 167 N.E. 804, 805 (Ill. 1929) (Illinois law); Marshall v. New York,
254 U.S. 380, 382 (1920) (New York law); In re Carnegie Trust Co., 99 N.E.
1096, 1098 (N.Y. 1912) (same); Field v. United States, 34 U.S. 182, 201 (1834);
State of Maryland v. Bank of Maryland, 1834 Md. LEXIS 16 (Md. 1834).
14. 6 U.S. 358 (1805). See infra notes 45-60 and accompanying text for a
discussion of Fisher,6 U.S. 358 (1805).
15. 31 U.S. 29 (1832); see also infra notes 103-112 and accompanying text
for a discussion of State Bank of North Carolina.
16. See Fisher, 6 U.S. at 373 (explaining that, while the priority of the King
applied to "cases where public monies have been received by an accountable
officer to public use," it did "not extend to transactions of a common nature").
17. State Bank of North Carolina,31 U.S. at 35.
18. Id.
19. United States v. Moore, 423 U.S. 77, 81 (1975); United States v. Emory,
314 U.S. 423, 428 (1941); Hofman v. United Welding & Mfg. Co., 102 A.2d 878,
880 (Conn. 1954); see also infra notes 368-82, 612-28 and accompanying text
for discussions of Emory and Moore respectively.
20. Act of July 31, 1789, ch. 5, § 21, 1 Stat.. 29, 42 (1789); see also Estate of
Romani, 523 U.S. 517, 526 n.9 (1998); United States v. Marxen, 307 U.S. 200,
206 n.12 (1939); United States v. Oklahoma, 261 U.S. 253, 259 (1923). See also
infra notes 255-67 and 361-368 and accompanying text for a discussion of
Oklahoma and Marxen respectively.
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goods.2 ' The Act of August 4, 1790,22 dealing with the same
subject, was the second priority statute that came into existence.
With the establishment of the Act of March 3, 1791, The United
States acquired priority with regard to other classes of creditors.23
The following year, the Act of May 2, 179224 gave sureties the right
of subrogation and limited priority to cases in which insolvency
was manifested by one of the modes specified. 5
Though the Acts of 1797 and 1799 were modified slightly over
the years, their basic premise remained constant.26 The Act of
March 3, 1797,7 the precursor to § 3713(a)(1)(A), was titled "An
Act to provide more effectually for the Settlement of Accounts
between the United States, and Receivers of public money."2 1 It
extended the priority from cases concerning defaults on custom
bonds to cases involving revenue
officers or others becoming
29
indebted to the United States:
And be it further enacted, that where any revenue officer, or
other person hereafter becoming indebted to the United
States, by bond or otherwise, shall become insolvent, or
where the estate of any deceased debtor, in the hands of
executors or administrators, shall be insufficient to pay all
the debts due from the deceased, the debt due to the United
States shall be first satisfied; and the priority hereby
established shall be deemed to extend, as well to cases in
which a debtor, not having sufficient property to pay all his
debts, shall make a voluntary assignment thereof, or in
which the estate and effects of an absconding, concealed, or
absent debtor, shall be attached by process of law, as to cases
in which an act of legal bankruptcy shall be committed."°

21. Price, 269 U.S. at 500-01.
22. Act of August 4, 1790, ch. 35, § 45, 1 Stat. 145, 169 (1790); see also
Oklahoma, 261 U.S. at 259 (citing in reverse chronological order the priority

statutes).
23. State Bank of North Carolina,31 U.S. at 36.
24. Act of May 2, 1792, ch. 27, § 18, 1 Stat. 259, 263 (1792); see also Marxen,
307 U.S. at 206 n.12; Oklahoma, 261 U.S. at 259.
25. Price, 269 U.S. at 501.
26. Emory, 314 U.S. at 428; State Bank of North Carolina, 31 U.S. at 38;

Fisher, 6 U.S. at 394. Indeed "[tlhe 1797 and 1799 Acts have survived to this
day essentially unchanged." Moore, 423 U.S. at 81.
27. Act of March 3, 1797, ch. 20, § 5, 1 Stat. 512, 515.
28. ch. 20, § 5, 1 Stat. at 512; Fisher,6 U.S. at 398.

29. See ch. 20, § 5, 1 Stat. at 515. Prior to the passage of this statute an
internal revenue service had been established in the United States, and
extensive transactions had taken place, in the course of which many persons
had become indebted to the United States. Fisher, 6 U.S. at 392. No attempt,
however, had hitherto been made to give a preference in the collection of such
internal revenue debts. Id. at 392-93; see also infra notes 44-60 and
accompanying text.
30. ch. 20, § 5, 1 Stat. at 515.

20061

The PriorityStatute

The Act of March 2, 1799,' the precursor to § 3713(a)(1)(B),
introduced the provision making the Priority Statute applicable to
executors, administrators, and assignees: 2
[W]here any bond for the payment of duties shall not be satisfied on
the day it may become due, the collector shall, forthwith... cause a
prosecution to be commenced

...

; and in all cases of insolvency, or

where any estate in the hands of executors, administrators or
assignees, shall be insufficient to pay all the debts due from the
deceased, the debt or debts due to the United States, on any such
bond or bonds, shall be first satisfied; and any executor,
administrator, or assignees, or other person, who shall pay any debt
due by the person or estate from whom, or for which, they are
acting, previous to the debt or debts due to the United States from
such person or estate being first duly satisfied and paid, shall
become answerable in their own person and estate, for the debt or
debts so due to the United States, or so much thereof as may remain
due and unpaid .... 33
In the first session of the forty-third congress, the priority
statutes of March 3, 1797 and March 2, 1799, were re-numbered as
§§ 3466 (Rev. Stat. § 3466) and 3467 (Rev. Stat. § 3467),
respectively, of the Revised Statutes of the United States.34 Rev.
Stat. § 3466 provided as follows:35
Whenever any person indebted to the United States is insolvent, or
whenever the estate of any deceased debtor, in the hands of the
executors or administrators, is insufficient to pay all of the debts
due from the deceased, the debts due to the United States shall be
first satisfied; and the priority hereby established shall extend as
well to cases in which a debtor, not having sufficient property to pay
all his debts, makes a voluntary assignment thereof, or in which the
estate and effects of an absconding, concealed, or absent debtor are
attached by process of law, as to cases in which an act of
bankruptcy is committed.

31. Act of March 2, 1799, ch. 22, § 65, 1 Stat. 627, 676.
32. See ch. 22, § 65, 1 Stat. at 676; Price,269 U.S. at 501. As was stated in
Moore, 423 U.S. at 81, the provision gave "the priority teeth."
33. ch. 22, § 65, 1 Stat. at 676; see also Brent v. Bank of Washington, 35
U.S. 596, 611 (1836) (discussing the priority statute as applicable to executors,
administrators and assignees); United States v. Hack, 33 U.S. 271, 274-75
(1834) (same). See also infra notes 113-124 and 130-150 for discussion of Heck
and Brent respectively.
34. There are minor differences in phraseology between the original Act
passed on March 3, 1797, and Rev. Stat. § 3466, which do not work any
changes in the purpose or meaning of the original legislation. Illinois ex rel.
Gordon v. Campbell, 329 U.S. 362, 371 n.9 (1946) (citing Price, 269 U.S. at
501). See infra notes 437-473 and accompanying text for a discussion of
Campbell.

35. ch. 20, § 5, 1 Stat. at 515 (currently codified at 31 U.S.C. § 3713 (2005)).
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Rev. Stat. § 3467 provided as follows:36
Every executor, administrator, or assignee, or other person, who
pays any debt due by the person or estate from whom or for which
he acts before he satisfies and pays the debts due to the United
States from such person or estate, shall become answerable in his
own person and estate for the debts so due to the United States, or
for so much thereof as may remain due and unpaid.

On December 7, 1925, Congress re-codified Rev. Stat. §§ 3466
and 3467 as §§ 191 (§ 191)38 and 192

(§ 192),"9 respectively, of the

United States Code. On May 10, 1934, § 192 was slightly revised
to read as follows:
Every executor, administrator, or assignee, or other person, who
pays, in whole or in part, any debt due by the person or estate for
whom or for which he acts before he satisfies and pays the debts due
to the United States from such person or estate, shall become
answerable in his own person and estate to the extent of such
payments for the debts so due to the United States, or for so much
thereof as may remain due and unpaid. 4°

36. ch. 22, § 65, 1 Stat. at 676.
37. The relationship between Rev. Stat. § 3466 and Rev. Stat. § 3467 was
explained in Bramwell, 269 U.S. at 490. The Court pointed out that the
persons held liable under Rev. Stat. § 3467 were:
[Elvery executor, administrator, or assignee, or other person. The
generality of the language is significant. Taken together, these sections
mean that a debt due the United States is required first to be satisfied
when the possession and control of the estate of the insolvent is given to
any person charged with the duty of applying it to the payment of the
debts of the insolvent, as the rights and priorities of creditors may be
made to appear.
Bramwell, 269 U.S. at 490.
38. 31 U.S.C. § 191 provided as follows:
Whenever any person indebted to the United States is insolvent, or
whenever the estate of any deceased debtor, in the hands of executors or
administrators, is insufficient to pay all the debts due from the
deceased, the debts due to the United States shall be first satisfied; and
the priority established shall extend as well to cases in which a debtor,
not having sufficient property to pay all his debts, makes a voluntary
assignment thereof, or in which the estate and effects of an absconding,
concealed, or absent debtor are attached by process of law, as to cases in
which an act of bankruptcy is committed.
Id. (current version at 31 U.S.C. § 3713(a) (2005)).
39. 31 U.S.C. § 192 provided as follows:
Every executor, administrator, or assignee, or other person, who pays
any debt due by the person or estate from whom or for which he acts,
before he satisfies and pays the debts due to the United States from
such person or estate, shall become answerable in his own person and
estate for the debts so due to the United States, or for so much thereof
as may remain due and unpaid.
31 U.S.C. § 192 (1926) (current version at 31 U.S.C. § 3713(b) (2005)).
40. Act of May 10, 1934, ch. 277, § 518(a), 48 Stat. 760 (1934); Beasley v.
C.I.R., 42 B.T.A. 275, 277 n.1 (1940).
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In 1978, as part of the major revamping of the bankruptcy
system, which repealed the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 and replaced it
with a new version of Title 11 of the United States Code, Congress
amended the Priority Statute by adding a section to § 191 which
provided that "this section does not apply, however, in a case
under title 11 of the United States Code."4 1
In 1982, the Priority Statute under §§ 191 and 192 were again
slightly revised and re-numbered to its current form under 31
U.S.C. § 3713(a)-(b). Section 3713(a) revised the phrase "the debts
due to' 2 United States to "a claim of."43 Section 3713(b) revised
the phrase "a debt due" to "a claim of.""

III. THE U.S. SUPREME COURT DECISIONS THROUGH THE YEARS
A.

1805: United States v. Fisher45

The decision in Fisher became the first by the highest court
interpreting a priority statute. The defendant was the endorser of
a foreign bill of exchange in favor of the State Collector, in his
official capacity.' The defendant-debtor went into bankruptcy and
his property was sold. 47 The Bankruptcy Act in effect at that time
provided that "nothing contained in this law shall in any manner
affect the right of preference to prior satisfaction of debts due to
the United States . . . .", The United States, in turn, sued the
assignees that held the debtor's property as a result of the
bankruptcy. 4"
A jury verdict was rendered in favor of the
defendants/assignees. 0
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the

41. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 322(a), 92 Stat.
2678 (1978); see also Estate of Romani, 523 U.S. at 531 n.15 (stating the
amended priority statute of 1978 is expressly inapplicable to Title 11
bankruptcy caeses). The current version of the Priority Statute is without
material change: "this subsection does not apply to a case under Title 11." 31
U.S.C. § 3713(a)(2) (2005).
42. Act of Sept. 13, 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-258, 96 Stat. 877 (1982). The
present Bankruptcy Act defines "debt" as "liability on a claim." 11 U.S.C.
§ 101(12) (2005). "Claim" is defined as a right to payment or a right to an
equitable remedy for breach of performance if such breach gives rise to a right
to payment. 11 U.S.C. § 101(5).
43. 11 U.S.C. § 101(5)(2000).
44. Pub. L. No. 97-258, 96 Stat. 877 (1982).

45. 6 U.S. 358 (1805).

46. Id. at 370.
47. Id. While the opinion is not clear, the bankruptcy proceeding, under
the Bankruptcy Act of 1800, must have been similar to the present-day
Chapter 7 proceeding, in which the debtor's property is liquidated in exchange
for a discharge of the debtor's personal liability.
48. United States v. Fisher, 25 F. Cas. 1087, 1087 (D. Penn. 1803).
49. Fisher,6 U.S. at 358.
50. Fisher,25 F. Cas. at 1089.
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judgment with the majority opinion written by the late Chief
Justice John Marshall."
Chief Justice Marshall enumerated six points in his
interpretation of the Act of 1797:
(1) The title of the 1797 Act, which spoke in terms of "receivers of
public money," did not limit the applicability of the Act to
such
"receivers" because an Act's title is not part of the legislation. 52
(2) The 1797 Act was not confined to revenue officers and persons
accountable for public money, but extended to debtors generally.m
(3) The 1797 Act did not create a lien in favor of the United States,
but only a priority in payment.4
(4) A bona fide transfer of property in the ordinary course of
business was not prohibited;8 and a bona fide alienation of property
before the right of priority attached was valid.58
(5) Congress was within its Constitutional powers to enact the
1797 Act.57
(6) It had been urged that the priority given to the United States
would interfere with the state sovereignties respecting the dignity of
debts, and would defeat the measures which they had a right to
adopt in order to secure themselves against delinquencies on the
part of their own officers.5 The Court, however, found this was a

51. Fisher, 6 U.S. at 397. The decision was unanimous, Justices Cushing,
Paterson, and Johnson, in addition to Chief Justice Marshall, voted to reverse.
Id. Justices Chase and Washington did not participate in the decision. Id.
52. Id. at 386.
53. Id. at 395.
54. Id. at 390. Justice Brandeis in Marshallv. New York, 254 U.S. 380, 386
(1920), a case dealing with a state Priority Statute, said that "[tihe right of
priority has been likened to an equitable lien ...[tihe priority is a lien in the
broad sense of that term."
55. Fisher, 6 U.S. at 390. This proposition was further addressed in the
second case considered by the court involving the Priority Statute. United
States v. Hooe, 7 U.S. 73 (1805). See infra notes 61-67 and accompanying text
for a discussion of Hooe.
56. Fisher, 6 U.S. at 395.
57. Id. at 396. The Court did not specifically refer to Article I, Section 8 of
the Constitution, which gives Congress the power to "provide for the...
general Welfare of the United States," even though, that was the provision
authorizing the enactment. The Court, rather, said: "it would be incorrect and
would produce endless difficulties, if the opinion should be maintained that no
law was authorised [sic] which was not indispensably necessary to give effect
to a specified power." Id. The Court continued with: "The government is to
pay the debt of the union, and it must be authorised [sic] to use the means
which appear to itself most eligible to effect that object. It has consequently a
right to make remittances by bills or otherwise, and to take those precautions
which will render the transaction safe." Id.
58. Id. at 397.
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direct objection to the Constitution itself 59 The mischief suggested,
so far as it can readily happen, was a necessary consequence of the
supremacy of the laws of the United States on all subjects to which
the legislative power of Congress extends.6°
1805: United States v. Hooe6 '

B.

In Hooe, the second Supreme Court case interpreting the
Priority Statute, Chief Justice Marshall referred to a point
established in Fisher, and expanded on the meaning of
"insolvency." Marshall reiterated the points mentioned in Fisher
that a bona fide alienation of property before the right of priority
attaches is valid, 2 and that "the priority to which the United
States are entitled, does not partake of the character of a lien on
the property of public debtors," a "distinction [that] is always to be
recollected."'
In the end, Marshall defined "insolvency" as a
debtor "not having sufficient property to pay all his debts[;]'
and
defined "property" as "unquestionably all the property which the
debtor possesses. " '
C.

66
1809: Harrisonv. Sterry

The next Supreme Court decision was again written by Chief
Justice Marshall, but did not specifically identify the statute in
question; Marshall only referred to it as "the act, which entitle[s]
the United States to a preference." 7
The Court held that a
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. 7 U.S. 73 (1805).
62. Id. at 89; see also supra notes 55 and 56 and accompaying text. Chief
Justice Marshall further commented that "[it is frequent for a person who
expects to become more considerably indebted, to mortgage property to his
creditor, as a security for debts to be contracted, as well as for that which is
already due." Hooe, 7 U.S. at 89. This point was acknowledged by the Court
in Savings & Loan Society v. Multnomah County, a case which did not deal
with the Priority Statute, but contained the following dictum: "This Court has
always held that a mortgage of real estate, made in good faith by a debtor to
secure a private debt, is a conveyance of such an interest in the land, as will
defeat the priority given to the United States by act of Congress in the
distribution of the debtor's estate." 169 U.S. 421, 428 (1898) (citing Hooe, 7
U.S. 73; Thelusson v. Smith, 15 U.S. 396, 426 (1817), and Conard v. Atlantic
Ins. Co., 26 U.S. 386, 441 (1828)). See also infra notes 75-86 and 83-99 and
accompanying text for a discussion of Thelusson and Conard respectively.
63. Hooe, 7 U.S. at 90.
64. Id. at 91. Marshall added: "general divestment of property, as would, in
fact, be equivalent to insolvency in its technical sense." Id. One hundred and
twenty-one years later in Bramwell v. United States, 269 U.S. 483, 487 (1926),
the Court identified "insolvency" by its most often used definition, i.e. where
the amount of one's debts exceed the value of one's assets.
65. Hooe, 7 U.S. at 91.
66. 9 U.S. 289 (1809).
67. Id. at 298.
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contract giving rise to a debt was effective to award the United
States priority even if it were executed in a foreign country,' and
that even though the statute was inapplicable to bankruptcy cases,
the United States did not waive its priority by filing a claim in
bankruptcy. 9
D. 1814: Prince v. Bartlett"
In Prince, the Supreme Court established two rules
concerning the application of the Priority Statute. First, the
"insolvency" required by the Priority Statute had to be a "legal and
known insolveney [sic] manifested by some notorious act of the
debtor pursuant to law: not a vague allegation, which, in adjusting
conflicting claims of the United States and individuals, against
debtors it would be difficult to ascertain."'" The second tenet was
that if a debtor was dispossessed of his property by a sheriffs levy
prior to the levy of another sheriff on behalf of the United States,
the latter could not obtain priority."
E.

1815: United States v. Bryan73

In Bryan, the Supreme Court held that the Priority Statute
did not apply to a debt which became due to the United States
prior to the passage of the Act.74
F.

1817: Thelusson v. Smith7 5

Thelusson recovered a judgment against a man named
Crammond, and others in Pennsylvania."6 The state judgment
constituted a lien against the judgment-debtor's real property.77
Two days after Mr. Thelusson's judgment was entered, Crammond
made an assignment for the benefit of creditors of all his property
while he was insolvent and indebted to the United States. 8 The
United States recovered judgments against Crammond and his
real property was levied upon and sold by the Marshal of the
District of Pennsylvania (Smith), to satisfy the United States'
judgment.79 Thelusson brought an action against the Marshal for

68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

Id. at 299.
Id. at 299-300.
12 U.S. 431 (1814).
Id. at 434.
Id.
13 U.S. 374 (1815).
Id. at 387.
15 U.S. 396 (1817).
Thelusson v. Smith, 23 F. Cas. 908, 909 (D. Pa. 1815).
Id.
Id.
Id.
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such of the proceeds of the sale as would satisfy his judgment.0
While the Court's opinion does not make it clear, apparently the
theory of Thelusson's action against the Marshal was that his
judgment primed the United States' judgments and the Marshal
should not have preferred the United States to him. The trial court
entered judgment in favor of the Marshal.8' The U.S. Supreme
Court affirmed, resting its decision primarily on § 65 of the
Priority Act of 1799.82 Under the Act, a judgment-creditor's lien
against a judgment-debtor's property would not defeat the priority
of the United States unless there had been a change in title or
possession of those lands by an official's seizure, or some other
equivalent act making the lien specific."3
As Justice
Washington's' interpretation states:
If... before the right of preference has accrued to the United
States, the debtor has made a bona fide conveyance of his estate to a
third person, or has mortgaged the same to secure a debt, or if his
property has been seized under a fi fa [ie. Writ of fieri facias], the
property is devested out of the debtor, and cannot be made liable to
the United States ....

But the act of Congress

defeats this

preference in favour of the United States, in the cases specified in
the 65th section of the Act of 1799.' 5
In other words, since the judgment creditor (Thelusson) had not
taken the debtor's property out of the debtor by the time the
priority of the United States was accorded, the Marshal was
correct in acknowledging that the U.S. primed the judgment
creditor whose judgment was prior in time to that of the federal
government.
80. Id.
81. Id.

82. 15 U.S. at 426. See supra text accompanying note 39 for the wording of
§ 65 of the Act of 1799.
83. Thelusson, 15 U.S. at 426. A mortgage could effect such a change.
Savings & Loan Society, 169 U.S. at 428 (1898).

84. Thelusson, 15 U.S. at 423.
85. Id. at 426. In a later case, Conard, Justice Story explained Thelusson
in his opinion for the Court, of which Justice Washington was a member. 26
U.S. at 386. Justice Story wrote:
The real ground of the decision, was, that the judgment creditor had
never perfected his title, by any execution and levy on the [judgment
debtor's] estate; that he had acquired no title to the proceeds as his
property, and that if the proceeds were to be deemed general funds of
the debtor, the priority of the United States to payment had attached
against all other creditors; and that a mere potential lien on land, did
not carry a legal title to the proceeds of a sale, made under an adverse
execution. This is the manner in which this case has been understood,
by the Judges who concurred in the decision; and it is obvious, that it
established no such proposition, as that a specific and perfected lien, can
be displaced by the mere priority of the United States; since that
priority is not of itself equivalent to a lien.
Id. at 444.
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However, to the extent the Court's opinion in Thelusson could
be interpreted to provide a statutory priority always according the
Government a preference over judgment creditors, that facet of
Thelusson has been overruled. 86
G. 1828: Conard v. Atlantic Insurance Co. of New York87
Conard, decided by the Supreme Court after Thelusson, also
1 7 9 9 .m The owner of tea on board two sailing
ships pledged the tea as collateral for a loan from an insurance
company (Atlantic Insurance Co. of New York) by an endorsement
of a bill of lading.89 While the borrower was insolvent he assigned
his property for the benefit of creditors.9 ° The United States
obtained a money judgment against the borrower.9 Atlantic sued
the sheriff (Conard), who levied on the tea.92 The borrower was
joined in the suit.93 The Supreme Court was presented with the
issue of to whom the proceeds of the sale of the tea were due - the
United States or the insurance company/lender?94
Justice Story, writing for the Court, analyzed the position of
Atlantic" by looking at the matter from the standpoint of the
United States:'
construed the Act of

What then is the nature of the priority, thus limited and established
in favour of the United States? Is it a right, which supersedes and
overrules the assignment of the debtor..., so as to prevent such
property from passing by virtue of such assignment to the
assignees? 97 Or, is it a mere right of prior payment, out of the
general funds of the debtor, in the hands of the assignees? We are of
86. See Estate of Romani, 523 U.S. 517 (overruling Thelusson on the ground
that the government is not always provided priority over judgment creditors).
87. 26 U.S. 386 (1828).
88. Id. at 438.
89. Id. at 434. The Court found the pledge papers to be in order. Id. at 437.
The fact that the lender never had possession of the collateral, did not
constitute fraud. Id. at 449.
90. Id. at 435.
91. Id. at 434.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 438-39. One-hundred and seventy years later, Justice Stevens
described this part of Justice Story's opinion as "dicta." Estate of Romani, 523
U.S. at 526. It could be that Justice Story was attempting to respond to the
government's argument that, if the priority was not a lien, it was nonetheless
superior to a lien. Conard, 26 U.S. at 440-41.
97. Reference to an assignment, no doubt referred to the transfer of
Thomson's interest in the tea under the pledge, rather than to his assignment
of his other assets for the benefit of creditors. Conard, 26 U.S. at 439. Either
assignment, so long as it placed the debtor's property outside the ownership
and control of the debtor prior to attachment of the United State's priority
would defeat that priority. Savings & Loan Society, 169 U.S. at 428.
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the opinion that it clearly falls, within the latter description. The
language employed is that which naturally would be employed to
express such an intent; and it must be strained from its ordinary
import, to speak any other. 98
The rule of law embodied within this often-quoted passage
apparently carried the day for the Court because the case was
decided in favor of Atlantic and against the United States.99
H.

1831: Hunter v. United States1"

In Hunter, the Supreme Court affirmed'
a circuit court
decision restricting the United States' priority to a fund held by
assignees/trustees after the costs of administering the assignment
were deducted. 102
L

1832: United States v. State Bank of North Carolina 3

In State Bank of North Carolina,one William H. Lippett owed
the United States money for customhouse bonds." Lippett, while
insolvent, made an assignment for certain creditors of his in
preference over others. 10 ' The United States filed a bill in equity
for collection of the amount Lippett owed them. 16
The issue
became whether the priority statute of March 3, 1791, applied to a
debt contracted for prior to the assignment, but payable
thereafter."7 Concluding that the Government's claim to priority
rested as a matter of settled law only on a statute,1 ° ' Justice Story
analyzed the wording of the statute, to wit: a debtor "becoming

98. Conard, 26 U.S. at 439.
99. Id. at 451. Justice Story made it clear that Thelusson "ha[d] been
greatly misunderstood at the bar, and will require a particular explanation."
He continued:
The United States... are to be first satisfied; but then it must be out of
the debtor's estate. If, therefore, before the right of preference has
accrued to the United States, the debtor has made a bona fide
conveyance of his estate, to a third person; or has mortgaged the same to
secure a debt - or if his property has been seized under a fieri facias,
the property is divested out of the debtor, and cannot be made liable to
the United States.
Id. at 441. No execution had ever been issued in Thelusson. Id. at 442.
100. 30 U.S. 173 (1831).
101. Id. at 189.
102. See United States v. Hunter, 26 F. Cas. 439, 439 (D.R.I. 1828). The
Circuit Court likened the matter to "the common case of administration.
There, the expenses are first deducted, and the residue... distributable
according to the priorities established by law." Id.
103. 31 U.S. 29 (1832).
104. Id. at 34.
105. Id. at 34-35.
106. Id. at 34.
107. Id. at 35.
108. Id.
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indebted to the United States, by bond or otherwise, shall become
insolvent... [and] the debt due the United States shall be first
satisfied." °9 Justice Story concluded that, though the word "due"
is sometimes used to express the mere state of indebtedness, it is
also sometimes used to express the fact that a debt has become
payable."0
Therefore, the statute clearly intended to cover
indebtedness, which might not occur until after an assignment had
taken place."' The Court further concluded that its holding was
compatible with the Act of March 2, 1799, which made every
executor, administrator, assignee or other person answerable for
failure to pay the United States first."'
J.

113
1834: United States v. Hack

The Act of 1799 was again considered in Hack, where two
partners, being financially "embarrassed and insolvent," made an
assignment of all partnership property for the benefit of
creditors." 4 The partnership property was sold, but the proceeds
were insufficient to pay the partnership debts."' The United
States, as a creditor of one of the partners, sought to invoke its
priority under the above statute on its debtor's share of those
proceeds."' The Supreme Court held that the government's claim
could not be paid out of those proceeds due to the nature of the
government's priority right."7 The Court rhetorically asked the
same question that was asked in Conard:"s What is the nature of
the right?"9 Is it a right which supersedes and overrules the
assignment of the debtor as to any property which the United
States may afterwards elect to take in execution, so to prevent
such property from passing by virtue of the assignment,"0 or is it a
mere right of prior payment, out of the general funds of the debtor
in the hands of the assignee?"' The Court answered in favor of the

109. Id. at 36.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 36-37. "The insufficiency spoken of in the act, is an insufficiency
not to pay a particular class of debts, but to pay all debts of every nature." Id.
at 37.
112. Id. at 39. It should be remembered that in 1982 Congress amended the
Priority Statute so that in § 3713(a) "debts due the" United States was
changed to "a claim of" and in § 3713(b) "a debt due" was changed to "a claim
of." See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
113. 33 U.S. 271 (1834).
114. Id. at 274.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 275-76.
118. See supra text accompanying note 97.
119. Hack, 33 U.S. at 275.
120. Id.
121. Id.
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latter. 2 Having previously acknowledged that a lien was not
created in favor of the United States,'23 and that they held a mere
right of prior payment, the Court concluded that the proceeds
consisted of joint property, rather than several."' As a result of
there being insufficient joint property to pay all of the joint debts,
individual property available for
the Court found there was no
22
payment to the United States.
21 6

K. 1835: Field v. United States

In Field, the Supreme Court ruled in favor of the United
States, despite the fact that it was not a party to the litigation
which awarded priority to the other creditor under a state priority
statute.'27 Chief Justice Marshall wrote for the unanimous Court 8
and pronounced that "[tihe local laws of the state could not, and
did not bind [the United States] in their rights. They could not
create a priority in favour of other creditors in cases of insolvency,
which should supersede that of the United States."'29
L. 1836: Brent v. Bank of Washington13
Brent owned several shares of stock of the Bank of
Subsequently, Brent became indebted to the Bank
Washington.'
as an endorser of three notes. 2 Before his death, Brent made an
assignment of all his estate in order to secure the United States
and others to whom he was indebted.' The assignment was never
accepted by the assignees/trustees and became inoperative."
Upon Brent's death his executors called upon the Bank to allow
them to transfer the stock for consideration to be received, but the
Bank refused on the ground that it had a lien on the stock for the

122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 276. Until such a surplus existed there was no individual
property available for the payment of debts of the individual partners. Id. at
275. While the Court did not specifically refer to state law governing the
partnership, it is submitted that state law would play a factor in the outcome
of the case. If state law provided that a partnership was an entity by itself
(such as a corporation), each individual partner would have no claim to
partnership property, no matter whether that property exceeded in value the
amount of the partnership debts.
126. 34 U.S. 182 (1834).
127. Id. at 202-03.
128. Id. at 199.
129. Id. at 201.
130. 35 U.S. 596 (1836).
131. Id. at 610.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 610-11.
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amount owed to it by Brent. 131 Instead, the Bank demanded
payment thereof before it would consent to the transfer. 136 The
Bank, moreover, filed suit against the executors to collect on the
notes.' 37
The Bank prevailed as to one note; however, the
executors prevailed on the two other notes under a statute of
limitations defense.'
The executors thereupon filed an action in
equity for the "use" of the United States in order to force the Bank
to consent to the transfer of the stock, free of any claim of the
Bank. 9 The executors claimed that the estate, being a debtor of
the United States (as was the deceased in his lifetime), had
insufficient funds with which to pay the debt due the United
States. 4 0 Hence the United States should have been paid before
other creditors of the estate pursuant to the Act of 1799.'14 The
circuit court ordered the stock to be sold at public sale, or so much
thereof as may be necessary to satisfy the notes, and the balance of
the notes to be transferred to the United States.'
The Supreme
Court in affirming the circuit court, made a clear ruling about
equity jurisprudence
and the function of a statute of limitations in
4 3
equity.
With regard to whether the executors alleged a case in equity,
the Court made clear, without explicitly stating the proposition,
that because the executors would have an adequate remedy at law,
the courts were justified in denying them equitable relief.'" The
Bank's charter provided that its stock could be transferred only on
its books; and that no transfer would be made if the bank is owed
money.'
The Court provided that those charter provisions would
have constituted a complete defense in a suit at law against the
135. Id. at 611.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 613. The record contained no evidence of insolvency, but the case
has been argued on the assumption that it existed. Id. at 613.
141. Id. at 611. The executors did not contest the Bank's lien on any
paramount right in them as executors. Id. at 613.
142. See Brent v. Bank of Washington, 4 F. Cas. 61 (D.C. Cir. 1824).
143. Brent, 35 U.S. at 611. The assignment was never accepted by the
assignees/trustees and became inoperative.
Id.
The Court's opinion
commenced by stating that the uniform construction of the Act of 1797 was
whether, in a case of insolvency, through a debtor's death or his assignment of
the property, the property of a debtor passes to the assignee or executor or
administrator. Id. The priority of the United States did not act to prevent the
transmission of the property, but the United States had a preference in the
payment out of the proceeds. Id. The priority did not attach to the property

legally transferred to a creditor, though that creditor may hold it subject to an
account, equity, or trust for the borrower. Id. at 612. Such transfer would be
protected against the United States. Id.

144. Id. at 613.
145. Id. at 613-14.
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bank by the executors, either in their own names, or for the use of
the United States." In this case the Court did not find it difficult
to decide what the rules of equity and good conscience required.
The Bank lent money to Brent on the name, credit, and stock of
the bank, which stock was owned by him, before the United States
could have any claim of preference."' The right of the Bank was a
legal right; the claim of the United States was statutory, not
founded upon any bad faith of the bank." The Court exclaimed
that in "good conscience there can be no claim more equitable than
that of the bank for money lent... [and] we can perceive no
reason why the United States should be exempted from this
fundamental rule of equity."
The executors took the position that the debt had been
extinguished as to the two promissory notes because the statute of
limitations as to them had run. 5 ' The Court in return stated that
the only thing extinguished by the running of the statute of
limitations was the remedy, not the debt. 5 ' The Court held that as
long as the debt remained unpaid, the notes could not form15 the
basis of any equitable relief seeking to obstruct their payment. 1
M. 1838: Beaston v. Farmers'Bankof Delaware53
Although Beaston was a complicated case, the Supreme Court
laid down some very firm rules. The United States obtained a
judgment against a Maryland bank for $ 21,200." A writ of fieri
facias"' was issued against the Bank, and returned nulla bona."
It was admitted that the bank was unable to pay its debts."7 After
an appeal, in which the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment, the
United States filed a bill in equity against the bank in an effort to
locate assets upon which to satisfy its judgment." For this action,
receivers were appointed with authority to take possession of the
M

146. Id. at 614. The Court opined that, "though the law gives the king a
better or more convenient remedy, he has no better right in court, than the
subject through whom the property claimed comes to his hands." Id.
147. Id. at 615.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 617.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. 37 U.S. 102 (1838).
154. Id. at 131.
155. A writ of fieri facias is the common law writ used to execute on property
of a judgment-debtor. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 641 (7th Ed. 1999).

156. Beaston, 37 U.S. at 131. When a writ of fieri facias (execution) is
returned by a Sheriff or Marshal with a notation thereon to the effect that that

official was unable to locate property of the judgment-debtor upon which to
execute, it is said to be returned nulla bona.
157. Beaston, 37 U.S. at 131.

158. Id.
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bank's property.
Subsequently, the Maryland Bank obtained a
judgment against Beaston in the amount of $500; and the
Farmers' Bank of Delaware was able to secure a judgment against
the Maryland Bank in the amount of $5,000.1'° The Farmers' Bank
turned around and garnished Beaston, as a debtor of its debtor,
the Maryland Bank.' Similarly, the United States also garnished
Beaston, as a debtor of its debtor, the same Maryland Bank.'62
Relying on the Priority Statute, the garnishee, Beaston, paid the
United States his $500 debt owed to the Maryland bank, in
preference to paying the Farmers' Bank." The Farmers' Bank
was forced to bring an action against Beaston in the county court,
seeking a declaration to the effect that the United States, under
the facts, could not claim priority." The county court agreed with
Beaston's interpretation that because the United States had
priority, he was correct in paying his $500 debt to the United
States.'
The court of appeals reversed, holding in favor of the
Farmers' Bank.'66 The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed, holding that
under the facts, the United States' lacked the priority required for
invocation of the Priority Statute. 7
Justice McKinley," writing for the Court, designated four
rules:
M

(1) no lien was established by the priority statute;
(2) although he may be unable to pay all his debts, the priority
established could not attach while the debtor continues to be the
owner and in the possession of the property;
(3) no evidence could be received of the insolvency of the debtor,
until he has been divested of his property in one of the modes stated
in the statute;
(4) whenever he was thus divested of his property, the person who
becomes invested with the title, was thereby made a trustee for the
United States, and was bound
to pay their debt out of the proceeds
69
of the debtor's property.
The opinion further stated two conclusions of law: (a) as the
Priority Statute referred to the public good it ought to be liberally

159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 132.
at 131-32.
at
at
at
at
at
at
at

132.
131.
132.
133.
137.
131.
133-34 (following the holdings in Fisher,Hooe, and Prince).
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construed; 7 ' and (b) Maryland Bank was a "person" within the
wording of the statute.'' The Court also stated a finding of fact the Maryland Bank had made no voluntary assignment of its
assets;17' hence, the United States did not acquire priority as to the
$500 debt of Beaston. 173
Justice Story registered the first dissent in any of the Priority
Statute cases. 17
Story thought that a corporation was not a
"person" within the meaning of the Priority Statute,'' and that the
majority was acting "extrajudicial," since the question was not
raised or considered by the lower court. 176 Curiously, Justice
Baldwin agreed with Justice Story, but also concurred with the
judgment of the Court.'7 7Justice
McLean agreed with Justice
8
Story, without qualification.'
N. 1875: Lewis v.United States179
Lewis was the trustee in bankruptcy for the estates of a
partnership and its individual partners, both of which were
insufficient to pay their creditors in full.'
The United States,
being owed money by the partnership, took an assignment of
partnership assets as collateral for that debt. 8 ' The United States
chose not to assert in the bankruptcy court either its secured
status over the partnership or to pursue the individual partners,
who also owed the United States money. 182 Instead, the United
States chose to sue the bankruptcy trustee (Lewis) in a court of
equity by asserting its right of priority against partnership assets
in satisfaction of the claims against the individual partners, under
the Priority Statute of March 3, 1797." Lewis asserted the Equity
Rule, incorporated into the Bankruptcy Act, which specified that
partnership assets were to be used only for the payment of
partnership debts, and that the debts of individual partners would
be paid out of property belonging to the individual partners."
170. Id. at 134.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 136. The Receivers appointed in the United States' bill in equity
took no action under the authority given them by the court, and even if they
had, such action would not constitute a voluntary assignment on the part of
the bank. Id.
173. Id. at 137.
174. Id. (Story, J., dissenting).
175. Id.
176. Id. at 138.

177. Id. at 137 (Baldwin, J., dissenting).
178. Id. at 137 (McLean, J., dissenting).
179. 92 U.S. 618 (1876).

180.
181.
182.
183.
184.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id. at

619-20.
619.
620.
624.
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On appeal, the Supreme Court found that the bankruptcy
statute then in existence (the Bankruptcy Act of 1867) and the
Priority Statute both gave the United States priority, and there
was no need for statutory construction as the two were to be
considered in pari materia9 9 Although the Bankruptcy Act and
the Priority Statute were identical in some of their wording, there
was a difference as to what fund was to be applied to the payment
of the United States' claims.186 The Bankruptcy Act said to pay the
United State's claim out of partnership assets, where on the other
hand the Priority Statute ordered payment out of the individual
partners' assets .18
In order to make the determination of which statute applied,
the Court thoroughly analyzed the Priority Statute of 1797.1 The
Court's analysis concluded that: the Priority Statute of 1797
affected persons who were "indebted to the United States[;J" the
language was general, not qualified; the form of indebtedness was
immaterial; the debt could be legal or equitable; the debtors could
be joint or several, principals or sureties; there must be a
bankruptcy or insolvency; and "Congress had the power to pass
the act."'89 The claims of the United States, therefore, were not
affected by the fact that Lewis held the assets of the partnership
as a trustee in bankruptcy.'9 ° The United States were entitled to
the same remedies as if Lewis had been appointed trustee by a
court other than a bankruptcy court. 1'9
The Court's analysis further provided that for several reasons
the Priority Statute applied to the facts of the case. The case
involved a trustee holding a trust fund and a cestui que trust
claiming it, which gave the equity court original and general
jurisdiction."' Furthermore, the fact that the fund arose in a court
of bankruptcy which also appointed the trustee did not affect the
United States' right to pursue in another court both the fund and
the trustee who held the fund.9 Additionally, there was no need
for the United States to pursue the collateral the trust was
holding.'

185. Id. at 622.
186. Id. at 620-24.
187. Id. at 624.
188. Id. at 620-21.
189. Id. at 621.
190. Id. at 622.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id. The Court added that the same remedies would be applicable had
the fund arisen and the trustee been appointed in any other manner. Id.
194. Id. "Itis a settled principle of equity that a creditor holding collaterals
is not bound to apply them before enforcing his direct remedies against the

debtor." Id. at 623.
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Finally, the Court announced that the Bankruptcy Act did not
apply under the facts of the case because the bankrupt parties
were all indebted to the United States, and they had separate
estates, which entitled the United States to its claimed
preference. 95' The obvious purpose of the Priority Statute was to
abrogate the rule insisted upon by the trustee."
The legal
relations of the partners with the United States in this controversy
were just what they would have been if the partners had not been
partners, or if the partnership had never existed.'97 The individual
interests of the partners would have amounted to nothing of value,
as the partnership was hopelessly insolvent.9
The government
could have no interest in the affairs of the firm. In order to be
satisfied, the United States was forced to seek its remedies outside
the bankruptcy forum."
0.

1877: Bayne v. United States"

In Bayne, the defendant fraudulently misappropriated U.S.
Army paymaster funds.201 The Supreme Court, in applying the
Priority Statute to the collection thereof, said that the form of
indebtedness or the mode in which it was incurred was
immaterial."2
P.

20
1883: Cook County National Bank v. United States

3

The Supreme Court denied application of Rev. Stat. § 3466 to
a claim of the United States against a national bank."4 The
United States had deposited certain funds in the Cook County
National Bank as a depository.'
When the bank became
insolvent, the United States demanded its deposits prior to the
rights of any other creditor on the authority of Rev. Stat. § 3466.6
195. Id. at 624.
196. Id. Since the Priority Statute of 1797 was enacted 70 years before the

Bankruptcy Act of 1867, the Court obviously meant that the Priority Act
abrogated the equity rule incorporated into the Bankruptcy Act, not the Act

itself.
197. Id. at 624-25.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 625.
200. 93 U.S. 642 (1877).

201. Id. at 642-43.
202. Id. at 643.
203. 107 U.S. 445 (1883).
204. See id. at 448 (applying "the act authorizing the formation of national
banks," and ruling the issue of whether the bank was insolvent "unnecessary
to consider").
205. See id. at 452 (identifying the issue as "whether the United States have
the right to claim the payment of this demand out of the surplus moneys
remaining in the treasury of the proceeds of the bonds deposited as security
for the circulating notes of the bank").

206. Id. at 447-48.
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The Court gave two reasons for denying the United States
their claimed right of priority under Rev. Stat. § 3466. First, The
National Banking Act, in effect at that time, undertook to provide
a complete system for the establishment and governance of
national banks, which was plainly inconsistent with the Priority
Statute."7 The Priority Statute was general and comprehensive in
its terms,1 8 whereas the National Banking Act dealt in specific
terms with, inter alia, the subject of protecting creditors of banks
which founder.Y The Court applied a doctrine that stated "[a] law
embracing an entire subject, dealing within it in all its phases,
may thus withdraw the subject from the operation of a general law
as effectually as though, as to such subject, the general law were
in terms repealed."210 Second, The National Banking Act made a
significant declaration that for any deficiency in the proceeds of
the bonds deposited for security for the circulating notes of the
bank, the U.S. would have a paramount lien upon all the bank's
assets, except for costs and expenses in administration of the
same. 211
The Court declared the aforementioned language
unnecessary and quite superfluous if for such deficiency the
United States already possessed, under the Act of 1797, the right
to be paid out of the assets of the bank in preference to the claims
of other creditors: 12 "The declaration considered in connection with
the ratable distribution of the assets, prescribed after such
deficiency is provided for, is equivalent to a declaration that no
other priority in the distribution of the proceeds of the assets is to
be claimed.""'
The Court made it clear that the Bankruptcy Act of 1867 did
not have an impact upon the Priority Statute lessening the United
States' rights of priority."4 It was stressed by the Court that the
bankruptcy enactment dealt with the estates of persons who are
insolvent under that law,"' and covered only the distribution of
their estates."6 The Act, it was concluded, had no further reach. 7

207. Id. at 451.
208. Id. at 447.
209. Id. at 449-50. When a bank founders, provisions are made for the
Comptroller of the Currency to appoint a Receiver and take other steps for the
protection of creditors. Id.
210. Id. at 451.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 451-52.
215. Id. at 452. Technically, under the Bankruptcy Act of 1867 voluntary
petitions could be filed in bankruptcy cases by persons who were solvent and
had considerable exemptions.
CHARLES JORDAN TABB, THE LAW OF
BANKRUPTCY § 1.6 b. (1997).
216. Id. at 452.
217. Id.
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The final issue resolved by the Court was whether the surplus
of monies that remained in the treasury after the sale of the bonds
by the Receiver could be used by the United States for the
payment of its claim, as such funds would have been more than
sufficient to pay the government in full. 18 Viewing the money
being held by the United States in its treasury as a trust, the
Court applied trust law in giving a negative answer to the
enquiry.219 As a trustee may not set-off2 ° his individual claims
against the settlor of a trust against trust property, so the Court
held, the United States may not reach this trust fund to satisfy its
claims against the bank, the entity which, while not the creator of
the trust, was the reason for the money coming into existence.221
Q. 1903: Smythe v. United States222
The Supreme Court affirmed a judgment on a bond given to
insure the faithful performance of duties by the superintendent of
the mint in New Orleans, despite the fact monies held by him were
lost due to his negligence or fault.222 In answer to an objection
raised to the form of the judgment, the Court referred to Rev. Stat.
§ 3467 only in passing.224
The Court emphasized that the
enforcement of a judgment against the administrator of an estate
will be interpreted and enforced subject to the priority given to the
government in the distribution of the proceeds of the estate of any
person indebted to the United
States whose estate was insufficient
225
to pay all debts against it.
R.

1912: GuaranteeTitle & Trust Co. v. Title Guaranty &
Surety Co.2 6
In GuaranteeTitle & Trust Co., the Supreme Court decided a
contest between the Priority Statute and the Bankruptcy Act of
1898, in which the Bankruptcy Act prevailed. Title Guaranty was
surety on a bond for a bankrupt and paid a judgment against its
218. Id.
219. Id. at 452-53.
220. See id. at 452 (viewing the procedure contemplated by the United
States as a set-off).

221. Id.
222. 188 U.S. 156 (1903).

223. Id. at 171-72.
224. See id. at 177 (mentioning the Revised Statutes only to acknowledge the
general proposition that priority is given to the government in the distribution
of proceeds of any estate or person indebted to the United States).
225. Id. at 177 (citing Rev. Stat. §§ 3466, 3467). Justice Peckham, the author
of Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), decided by the same Court two
years later, dissented (along with Justice Shiras), as to the decision of the

Court in Smythe, but not as to what the Court said, by way of dictum, about
the Priority Statute. Id. at 178-83 (Peckham, J., dissenting).
226. 224 U.S. 152 (1912).
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principal, the bankrupt, and sought, as subrogee of the rights of
the United States, to be reimbursed before the other creditors
were paid their indebtedness." '
The Bankruptcy Trustee
(Guarantee Title & Trust Co.), however, argued that wage claims
were to be paid before any claims due the United States."'
The Court examined the Bankruptcy Act of 186729 and found
it specifically gave the United States priority for the payment of
expenses and for "all debts due to the United States and all taxes
and assessments under the laws thereof."2 3
Such priority was
coextensive with that given by the Priority Statute - Rev. Stat.
§ 3466. 231
The Bankruptcy Act of 1898, then in effect,"' gave no such
priority to the United States. 233
Wage claims, moreover,
specifically primed claims of the United States. 4 The Court
concluded that Congress' decision affecting a change in the
Bankruptcy Act from its 1867 version to its 1898 version was
intended and was beneficent. 35' The Court's closing words left no
doubt of their conclusion:
It will be seen.., that by the statute of 1797 (now § 3466) and
§ 5101 of the Revised Statutes all debts due to the United States
were expressly given priority to the wages due any operative, clerk
or house servant. A different order is prescribed by the act of 1898,
and something more. Labor claims are given priority, and it is
provided that debts having priority shall be paid in full. The only
exception is "taxes legally due and owing by the bankrupt to the
United States, State, county, district or municipality." These were
civil obligations, not personal conventions, and preference was given
227. Id. at 153.

228. Id. at 155.
229. The Bankruptcy Act of 1867 was the third Bankruptcy Act in effect in
the United States. It was effective from 1867 until 1898, when the fourth
Bankruptcy Act became effective. CHARLEs JORDAN TABB, THE LAW OF
BANKRUPrCY § 1.6 (1997).
230. GuaranteeTitle & Trust Co., 224 U.S. at 159.

231. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
232. The Bankruptcy Act of 1898 was the fourth Bankruptcy Act enacted by
Congress. In re Marshall, 300 B.R. 507, 514 n.14 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2003). It

lasted until October 1, 1979 when the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 (the
present law), became effective. Id. at 514. The first two bankruptcy acts were
short-lived. The fist was effective from 1800 until 1803, and the second from
1841 until 1843. Id. The third bankruptcy act was in effect from 1867 until
its repeal in 1878. Id. Except during the effective dates of those Acts, the
United States had no federal bankruptcy statue. See Prince v. Bartlett, 12
U.S. 431, 433 (1814) (acknowledging that at the time the case was decided
there was no Bankruptcy Act in existence). States do not have bankruptcy
statutes because Article I, Section 8, Clause 4 of the Federal Constitution
gives that power to Congress.
233. GuaranteeTitle & Trust Co., 224 U.S. at 160.
234. Id.
235. Id.
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to them, but as to debts we must assume a change of purpose in the
change of order. And we cannot say that it was inadvertent. The
act takes into consideration, we think, the whole range of
indebtedness of the bankrupt, national, state and individual, and
assigns the order of payment. The policy which dictated it was
beneficent and well might induce a postponement of the claims,
even of the sovereign in favor of those who necessarily depended
upon their daily labor. And to give such claims priority could in no
case seriously affect the sovereign. To deny them priority would in
136
all cases seriously affect the claimants.
S.

1920: United States v. National Surety Co.2'

Justice Brandeis delivered the opinion for the Court in
National Surety Co.'
National Surety Company ("National")
executed two surety bonds to secure contracts entered into with
the United States. 239
The contractor defaulted and was
subsequently adjudicated a bankrupt. 24 0 National later paid the
amount of the bonds to the United States.24 '
Though the
bankrupt's net assets were less than the amount of the
government's claim, both the United States (under Rev. Stat.
§ 3466) and National (under Rev. Stat. § 3468) 2 filed claims in the
Bankruptcy Court. 24
National asserted priority on pro rata
equality with the government.244 The referee in bankruptcy, the
district court, and the eighth circuit ruled for National. 5
On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed, holding that under
Rev. Stat. § 3468, National would have priority over all creditors,

236. Id. at 159-60.
237. 254 U.S. 73 (1920).
238. Id. at 74.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. Id. at 74-75. Rev. Stat. § 3468 read as follows:
Whenever the principal in any bond given to the United States is
insolvent, or whenever, such principal being deceased, his estate and
effects which come to the hands of his executor, administrator, or
assignee, are insufficient for the payment of his debts, and, in either of
such cases, any surety on the bond, or the executor, administrator, or
assignee of such surety pays to the United States the money due upon
such bond, such surety, his executor, administrator, or assignee, shall
have the like priority for the recovery and receipt of the moneys out of
the estate and effects of such insolvent or deceased principal as is
secured to the United States; and may bring and maintain a suit upon
the bond, in law or equity, in his own name, for the recovery of all
moneys paid thereon.
Rev. Stat. § 3468 (1875) (current version at 31 U.S.C. § 9309).
243. Id. at 74-75.
244. Id. at 75.
245. Id.

The John MarshallLaw Review

1232

[39:1205

except the United States, if it discharged its obligations. 46' Justice
Brandeis concluded his opinion with an assessment that Rev. Stat.
§ 3468 applied an established rule of subrogation."7 Brandeis then
continued:
What the surety asks here is not to enjoy like priority over such
other creditors, but equality with the United States, a creditor
whose debt is partly secured. To accord such equality would abridge
the priority expressly conferred upon the Government. While the
priority given the surety by the statute attaches as soon as the
obligation upon the bond is discharged, it cannot ripen into
enjoyment unless or until the whole debt due the United States is
satisfied. This result is in harmony with a familiar rule of law of
subrogation under which a surety liable only for part of the debt
does not become subrogated to collateral or to remedies available to
the creditor unless he pays the whole debt or it is otherwise
satisfied.m
T.

1923: United States v. Oklahoma24 9

The decision in Oklahoma exemplifies the importance of
pleading. In Oklahoma, a state bank examiner reported a state
bank to the state Commissioner of Banks because the examiner
found the bank was insolvent under Oklahoma law, unable to pay
its debts, and would continue as a going banking concern. 20 The
state official, based upon that report and acting under state law,
adjudged the bank insolvent and took charge and possession of its
assets, books and records for the purpose of protecting the bank's
depositors.2 1
The United States was a depositor of money
belonging to Indian tribes, and a beneficiary of a bond given by the
bank for its protection. ' As a result of the bank's insolvency, the
United States filed a suit in the U.S. Supreme Court' against the
State of Oklahoma, seeking first priority to the bank's assets,
which exceeded in value the amount of the United States'
deposits. 2'
The State moved to dismiss the complaint on the
ground that it failed to state a cause of action under the Priority
Statute (Rev. Stat. § 3466).255

246. Id. at 76.
247. Id. at 75.

248. Id. at 76.
249. 261 U.S. 253 (1923).

250. Id. at 257.
251. Id.
252. Id. at 256.

253. Id. Under Article III, Section 2 of the United States Constitution,
actions in which a State is a party may be filed as an original action in the
U.S. Supreme Court.
254. Id. at 257.
255. Id. at 256.
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The Supreme Court granted the motion on two grounds: (1) a
lack of sufficient allegation of the bank's insolvency and (2) lack of
a sufficient allegation of an "act of bankruptcy."256 The United
States' complaint alleged that the bank was not able to pay its
debts in the ordinary course of business, was a going concern, and
that the bank examiner had found it to be insolvent." The Court
found that one's inability to pay one's debts as they accrue may be
considered a form of insolvency, but the Priority Statute required
pleading and proof of the type of insolvency specified by the
Bankruptcy Act of 1898, which was the liabilities-exceeding-assets
test.2" With regard to the failure to allege an "act of bankruptcy,"
the Court demonstrated "[there is not alleged any conveyance to
defraud, or preference through transfer or through legal
59
proceedings, or general assignment for the benefit of creditors.""
Furthermore, the Commissioner of Banking was not acting as a
receiver or trustee, but rather as an arm or instrumentality of the
state in the exercise of its police powers to affect the purpose of
state law for the protection of depositors."
Hence, the
Commissioner's taking charge of the bank's assets was not the
same action as that of an assignee or trustee, which 261would
constitute an "act of bankruptcy" under the Priority Statute.
U. 1925: Davis v. Pringle2"
The majority opinion in Davis was written by Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes, Jr.2" Davis represented another clash between
the Priority Statute and the Bankruptcy Act of 1898.
The
Supreme Court held the Bankruptcy Act gave the U.S. priority to
all taxes legally due to the United States, but not to ordinary
debts."
The Court, in its analysis, relied more on a grammatical
construction of the Bankruptcy Act than it did on legislative
history. The first part of § 64 of the Bankruptcy Act required the
256. Id. at 263.
257. Id. at 260.
258. Id. at 261. A person was insolvent under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898
"whenever the aggregate of his property, exclusive of any property which he
may have conveyed, transferred, concealed, or removed, or permitted to be
concealed or removed with intent to defraud, hinder or delay his creditors,

shall not, at a fair valuation, be sufficient in amount to pay his debts." Id.
259. Id. at 262.
260. Id. at 262-63.
261. Id. at 263.
262. 268 U.S. 315 (1925).
263. Id. at 316.
264. Id. at 317-19. Section 64(a) of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 provided that
"[tihe court shall order the trustee to pay all taxes legally due and owing by
the bankrupt to the United States... in advance of the payment of dividends
to creditors." Bankruptcy Act of 1898, §64(a), ch. 541, 30 stat. 544, 563
(repealed 1978).
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trustee in a bankruptcy to pay all taxes legally due to the United
States in advance of other creditors.265 Justice Holmes thought it
incredible anyone would argue, having given the United States
such a conspicuous place with reference to taxes, that Congress
"intended to smuggle in a general preference by muffled words at
the end."266 Justice Holmes further added:
The ordinary dignities of speech would have led to the mention of
the United States at the beginning of the clause, if within its
purview. Elsewhere in cases of possible doubt when the Act means
the United States it says the United States. We are of opinion that
to extend the definition of "person" here to the United States would
be "inconsistent with the context" .... 67
The Court concluded there was a change of purpose from the
Bankruptcy Act of 1867, to the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, because
the public opinion regarding the peculiar rights and preferences
due to the sovereign had changed. 2' As pronounced in Guarantee
Title & Trust Co. 266 the Bankruptcy Act was an appropriate place
in which to reflect public policy changes.
V. 1926: Bramwell v. U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co.

27 1

In Bramwell, an Oregon bank had on deposit some money
belonging to Indian tribes and individual members thereof. 72 The
bank had posted a bond as depository of these funds with the U.S.
Fidelity & Guaranty Co. ("Fidelity") as surety.272 When the bank
became insolvent and suspended payment of the money so held, its
Board of Directors passed a resolution giving Bramwell, as the
Oregon State Superintendent of Banks, full control of the Bank's
affairs.
Pursuant to state law, Bramwell took possession and
control of all of the Bank's property, including money on deposit,
for the purpose of liquidating it. 5 Fidelity paid the amount of the

265. Id.
266. Id. at 318.
267. Id. Section 64(b)(7) gave priority to "debts owing to any person who by
the laws of the States or the United States is entitled to priority." City of
Lincoln v. Ricketts, 297 U.S. 373, 374 (1936). The Court in Ricketts pointed
out that on May 27, 1926 Congress amended § 64 (b)(7) of the Bankruptcy Act
to specifically provide that the word "person" include corporations; since the

United States was a corporation, the United States was included within the
term "person." Id. at 376.
268. Davis, 268 U.S. at 318.
269. See 224 U.S. at 159-60 (pronouncing that the Bankruptcy Act takes into

account the whole range of indebtedness of the Bankrupt).
270. Davis, 268 U.S. at 318.
271. 269 U.S. 483 (1926).

272. Id. at 485.
273. Id.

274. Id. at 485-86.
275. Id. at 486.
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bond to the superintendent of the reservation on which the tribes
were located and received from the United States an assignment of
the United States' claim against the bank.276 Fidelity claimed it
was entitled to assert the United States' priority and be paid first
out of the bank's property.2 " Bramwell acknowledged Fidelity's
claim, but denied its assertion of priority.2 8
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment in favor of
Fidelity. 7 9 The Bank's insolvency having been admitted,'80 Supt.
Bramwell focused on two main points in his argument to the
Supreme Court. First, the resolution of the Board of Directors was
not a "voluntary assignment" of its property within the provisions
of Rev. Stat. § 3466,"l and second, the bankruptcy statute then in
effect 82 did not apply to banks; 83 the bank, therefore, could not
have committed an "act of bankruptcy. 2'
The Court rejected
Bramwell's contentions, exclaiming that the bank's assignment of
its property to the state's Superintendent of Banks, albeit required
to do so under state law, was tantamount to an assignment of title
to a debtor's property for the purpose of converting it into money
for the payment of the debtor's debts; hence, it met the
requirement of an "assignment" under the Priority Statute.2" In
response to the "act of bankruptcy" argument, the Court answered
that § 3(a) of the Bankruptcy Act defined "acts of bankruptcy" in a
general manner. 28 Therefore, Rev. Stat. § 3466 did not require
that the debtor be in bankruptcy (i.e. be the subject of a
bankruptcy case), but rather only that the debtor commit an "act
of bankruptcy," or another of the two alternatives 7 while

276.
277.
278.
279.
280.
281.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 492.
Id. at 487.
Id. at 488.

282. The Bankruptcy Act of 1898 was the Bankruptcy statute in effect at the

time Davis was decided. Id. at 487.
283. Id. at 488. The Bankruptcy statutes of the United States have never
applied to banks or other named institutions because Congress has passed
statutes which are specifically applicable to them in case of their financial
difficulties. CHARLES JORDAN TABB, THE LAW OF BANKRUpTcY § 2.2 (1997).
284. Bramwell, 269 U.S. at 488. Supt. Bramwell apparently did not argue

the point that Rev. Stat. § 3466 did not apply to Title 11 cases, because the
Priority Statute was not amended to specifically so provide until 1978. See
supra note 41 and accompanying text.
285. Bramwell, 269 U.S. at 491-92.

286. Id. at 489.
287. To wit, an alternative to an "act of bankruptcy" exists when a person (1)
makes an assignment of all of his property, or (2) while "absent" has his
property attached. Rev. Stat. § 3466 (1875) (current version at 31 U.S.C.
§ 3713 (2000)); see also Bramwell, 268 U.S. at 486 for reference to the
language of Rev. Stat. § 3466.
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insolvent.2"
W. 1926: Prince v. United States'
In Prince, the Court announced that taxes due the United
States are debts,29 ° and as such are covered by the Priority
Statute.2' A creditor sought equitable relief by appointment of a
receiver on the basis that, if the corporate debtor's assets were sold
in the ordinary course of business, there would be enough money
with which to pay all debts; whereas, if some creditors' were
allowed a free reign, it was doubtful whether such outcome would
occur.
The debtor agreed and joined in the Petition, resulting in
the appointment of a receiver.' 2 After the receiver commenced
administration it was discovered that, in fact, there were
insufficient assets to pay all creditors, and general creditors would
receive no more than forty percent of their claims. 4 The United

288. Id. at 490. A note of explanation is required here, especially for those
who may not be completely conversant with bankruptcy law.
Under
bankruptcy statutes applicable in this county prior to October 1, 1979, when
the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 took effect, a debtor could not be forced
into involuntary bankruptcy by its creditors unless it had committed an "act of
bankruptcy." As the Court in Bramwell said, the Act defined "acts of
bankruptcy" as a general assignment of property for the benefit of creditors, a
requested or involuntary appointment of a receiver while the debtor was
insolvent, and other such acts revealing a need of the protection of the nation's
bankruptcy laws. 269 U.S. at 489. The Supreme Court also expressed an "act
of bankruptcy" as an "insolvency manifested by some notorious act." Prince v.
Bartlett, 12 U.S. 431, 434 (1814). The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 did
away with these "acts of bankruptcy" as a requirement for involuntary
bankruptcy, except that sub-Section 303 (h)(2) of the Act came close to the
"acts of bankruptcy." Id. It authorizes an involuntary bankruptcy petition to
be filed if "a custodian, other than a trustee, receiver, or agent appointed or
authorized to take charge of less than substantially all of the property of the
debtor for the purpose of enforcing a lien against such property, was appointed
or took possession" within 120 days prior to the filing of the involuntary
petition by creditors. 11 U.S.C. § 303(h)(2) (2005). A Bankruptcy Judge in In
re Marshall, 300 B.R. 507, 519 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2003), interpreted both 11
U.S.C §§ 303 (h)(1) and (h)(2) to constitute acts of bankruptcy. For further
discussion of this subject see infra notes 651-656 and accompanying text. See
also The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 11 U.S.C.S., 28 U.S.C.S. (2005)).
The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 was the bankruptcy law in effect in the
United States at the time of this article's publication; it contains no specific
reference to "acts of bankruptcy."
289. 269 U.S. 492 (1926).
290. Id. at 499. The Priority Statute, as amended in 1982, refers to "claims"
due the United States, rather than "debts." See supra notes 43, 44 and
accompanying text.
291. Prince, 269 U.S. at 499.
292. Id.
293. Id.
294. Id.
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States filed a claim for taxes and unpaid customs duties.295 A
special master found in favor of the United States; the district
court and the court of appeals affirmed.2" The Supreme Court
granted certiorari and affirmed, 97 with the majority opinion noting
the following rules of statutory construction:
The meaning properly to be attributed [to the word debts] depends
upon the connection in which it is used in the particular statute and
the purpose to be accomplished.
In the absence of another remedy made exclusive, an action of debt
lies to recover taxes where the amount due is certain or readily may
be made certain.298
X.

1926: Stripe v. United States299

The facts and issues in Stripe, were so similar to Price that
the Court simply referenced Price in rendering its decision."
Y. 1926: United States v. Butterworth-JudsonCorp.

1

In Butterworth, the Court declared that the facts established
in the trial court would be utilized to determine whether the
Priority Statute would apply, regardless of what the pleadings
alleged about the solvency of the debtor. 2°
Z. 1926: Mellon v. Michigan Trust Co.3

3

Approximately four months after deciding Bramwell, Price,
Stripe and Butterworth, the Supreme Court held that a statute
which provided that the Director General of Railroads, who
operated railroads in this country during hostilities (World War I),
was subject to the same laws as commercial operators of
railroads."°' As such, the Director could not defend any legal
actions against him by invoking sovereignty, and was not
permitted to use the Priority Statute in collecting debts owed to
him in his official capacity."' The Court opined that "[to permit
the claimed preference, we think, would conflict with the spirit

295. Id.
296. Id. (relying upon the decision in Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Johnson
Shipyards Corp., 6 F.2d 752 (2d Cir. 1925)).
297. Id. at 503.

298. Id. at 500.
299. 269 U.S. 503 (1926).

300. Id. at 503.
301. 269 U.S. 504 (1926).
302. See id. at 513 (declaring respondent insolvent on the premise that is

what the intervening petition showed when the creditors suit was initiated).
303. 271 U.S. 236 (1926).

304. Id. at 238.
305. See id. at 238-39.

1238

The John MarshallLaw Review

[39:1205

and broad purpose of the statute [pertaining to the Director
General's operation of railroads]."
AA. 1929: County of Spokane v.United States"7
The contested issue in County of Spokane was whether the
United States had priority for taxes due under federal law, or did
state and county taxes under a Washington statute prime federal
taxes. 3'
A receiver was appointed
for the insolvent
debtor/taxpayer. °9 The Supreme Court of Washington ruled in
favor of the United States."0 The United States Supreme Court, in
an opinion written by Chief Justice William Howard Taft, 3 "
considered a number of cases previously addressing the issue."'
The rationale for the Court's decision to give priority to the
federal government was grounded on the fact that the state tax
was not a perfected lien upon the insolvent's property on the date
of the receivership.313 Affirming the lower court's judgment, Chief
Justice Taft concluded his recitation of cases with the following
words: "The foregoing citations certainly make it clear that the
United States has power, in order to collect its taxes and its
revenues and debts due it, to confer priority for them over those of
3
the States."M
The Court reserved ruling on the issue of whether a
different result would have been determined had the lien been
proved at the time of the receivership.1 5

306. Id. at 240.
307. 279 U.S. 80 (1929).
308. Id. at 85.
309. Id.
310. Id. at 86.
311. Id. at 85.
312. The opinion considered the following cases: Fisher, 6 U.S. 358 (1805)
(holding that the U.S. was entitled to priority); United States v. Nicholls, 4
Yeates 251 (Pa. Cir. Ct. 1805) (holding that state taxes primed federal taxes,
despite the federal priority statute); United States v. Peters, 9 U.S. 115 (1809)
(holding that a state legislature may not annul the judgment of a federal
court); Field v. United States, 34 U.S. 182 (1835) (holding that the United
States need not be a party to litigation to be entitled to priority); Lane County
v. Oregon, 74 U.S. 71 (1869) (holding that the states must not burden or
embarrass the operations of the national government); United States v.
Snyder, 149 U.S. 210 (1893) (stating that the grant of the power (to the federal
government) and its limitations are wholly inconsistent with the proposition
that the states can by legislation interfere with the assessment of federal
power); and United States v. Oklahoma, 261 U.S. 253, 260 (1923) (holding that
when a debtor is divested of his property, the person "invested with the title is
made trustee for the United States" and bound first to pay the United States
out of the debtor's property).
313. County of Spokane v. United States, 279 U.S. 80, 93-94 (1929).
314. Id. at 93.
315. See id. at 95.
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BB. 1930: United States v. Guaranty Trust Co. of New York316
The Supreme Court in Guaranty Trust Co. of New York, held
that the Priority Statute did not apply to claims pursuant to the
Transportation Act of 1920. ' Title II of the Act provided for
funding of debts to the United States incurred by railroads during
the period of wartime control (World War I)."' The Act also
1 9
provided for new loans to the railroads."
As certain railroad lines
became insolvent, the United States attempted to collect the loans
by enlisting the assistance of the priority statute. 32 0 The Court
held the Priority Statute inapplicable because the purpose of the
Transportation Act was to promote the general credit status of the
railroads." 1 As such, railroads were required to furnish adequate
security for the payment of both old and new loans. 322 For these
reasons, the Court stated the United States would not be
furnished an additional method of collection.33 In addition, the
rate that was being paid by the railroads was "much greater than
that which ordinarily accompanies even a business loan carrying
such assurance of repayment as would have resulted from an
application of the priority rule."32 ' These two points convinced the
Court that Congress had intended to exclude these loans from the
scope of Rev. Stat. § 3466. 325
32
CC. 1933: New York v. Maclay

6

In Maclay, receivers were appointed for an insolvent debtor
corporation under a consent decree, and they took possession and
control of the debtor's property.2 The United States filed a claim
for taxes and expenses. 38 The State of New York also filed a claim
with the receivers for franchise taxes due, but not assessed or
liquidated (i.e. the amount was not determined), until after the
receivership.3" The district court held that under 31 U.S.C. § 191
the United States had priority over the State of New York with the

316.
317.
apply
§ 207,
318.
319.
320.
321.

322.
323.
324.
325.
326.
327.
328.
329.

280 U.S. 478 (1930).
See id. at 483 ("[1It was the purpose of Congress that § 3466 should not
to any indebtedness of the railroads to the United States arising under
209 or 210 of [the] Transportation Act [of] 1920.").
Id. at 481.
Id. at 482.
Id. at 483.
Id. at 484-85.

Id. at 485.
Id. at 485-86.
Id. at 486.
Id.
288 U.S. 290 (1933).
Id. at 291.
Id.
Id.
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33 °
Second Circuit affirming.

The decision written by Justice Cardozo33' referred to the
holdings in County of Spokane3 2 and Thelusson."3 Relying on this
precedent, the Court held the receivership had the effect of a
general assignment. 34 However, since its amount had not been
determined as of that time, the lien was nothing more than a
warning to mortgagees and purchasers of a contingent liability,
not unlike a lis pendens. 35 The lien, therefore, was not sufficiently
choate 3 1 to defeat the priority of the United States.337 The position
of the Court thus became that the lien was not then enforceable,
but instead served as the caveat of a more perfect lien to come.3
DD.1936: United States v. Knott

9

In Knott, a New Jersey surety company deposited $75,000
worth of securities with the State of Florida in order to be
permitted to write bonds there."'
Subsequently, the surety
company became insolvent and upon its petition a New Jersey
court ordered the New Jersey Commissioner of Banking and
Though it had
Insurance to liquidate the surety company."'
written many bonds in Florida, there were no unsatisfied
judgments against it at the time liquidation proceedings
commenced.342 The New Jersey Commissioner of Banking and
Insurance brought an action in Florida seeking to restrain the

330. Id.
331. Id.
332. Id. County of Spokane was cited for the proposition that the Court
acknowledged Congress had the power to give priority to debts due the United
States though the debts thereby subordinated were due to the people of a state
or its political subdivisions.
Id.; see also supra notes 307-315 and
accompanying text.
333. Id. at 293. Thelusson was cited for the proposition that the general lien
of a judgment upon the lands of an insolvent debtor is subordinate to the
preference established by statute unless there has been seizure by a Marshal
or some other equivalent act has made the lien specific and brought about a
change of title or possession. Id. at 293-94. See also supra notes 75-86 and
accompanying text.
334. Id. at 291.
335. Id. at 293.
336. Id. Justice Thurgood Marshall, in United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc.,
justified the use of the word "choate" by noting that "it has proved difficult for
nonfederal lienors to satisfy the strictures of the choateness test." 440 U.S.
715, 721 n.8 (1979).
337. Maclay, 288 U.S. at 294 (describing the lien in this case as a "lien of a
tax not presently enforceable, but serving merely as a caveat of a more perfect
lien to come").
338. Id.
339. 298 U.S. 544 (1936).
340. Id. at 545.
341. Id.
342. Id. at 545-46.
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disposition of the deposited securities except upon order of the
Florida court.3" This action was consolidated with a creditor's suit
in Florida (under a Florida statute), seeking the appointment of a
receiver. 3" Thereafter, the United States filed a claim under 31
U.S.C. § 191 for a receivership action, seeking priority over the
aggregate of twenty judgments on estreated bail bonds.345
During the state proceedings, the Florida court ruled that
debts due to Florida, its political subdivisions, citizens, and
residents were to be paid ahead of all other claims. 4 ' However,
the decree did not state whether the United States were entitled to
receive, in Florida, payments from the residue, if any, or whether
that residue was to be transmitted to New Jersey, the place of the
domiciliary liquidation.4 7 The Florida Supreme Court affirmed.3"
On appeal to the United States Supreme Court, Justice
Brandeis3 ' reversed the Florida Supreme Court. 50 The Court
found the argument suggesting that Congress abrogated priority
in favor of the United States through provisions in 6 U.S.C §§ 111, was without merit.3"' The Supreme Court of Florida had held
that the statutory amendment requiring deposit did not change
substantive rights of the parties; hence, there could not be a
divestment of the right of priority under the precedents of the
United States Supreme Court.353 While the Court accepted the
Florida Supreme Court's interpretation of the Florida statute to
the extent that the deposit of securities constituted a trust fund for
the benefit of Florida creditors,3" the Court rejected the argument
that there would be a surplus which would be paid to the United
States as there was no Florida court ruling to that effect, and the
Florida judgment denying priority to the United States prejudiced
their rights.3" Next, the argument that the Supreme Court lacked
jurisdiction was also without merit, since the order appealed from
was a final one.355 Finally, the Court did not accept the argument
that a Florida court would not have jurisdiction to order priority

343. Id. at 546.
344. Id.
345. Id.
346. Id.
347. Id. at 546-47.
348. Id. at 547.
349. Id. at 545.
350. Id. at 552.
351. Id. at 547-48. 6 U.S.C. §§ 1-11 prescribes the conditions under which a
surety company may write certain surety bonds in favor of the United States.
Id. at 547.
352. See id. at 550 (referring to Thelusson and Beaston).
353. Id. at 548-49.
354. Id. at 551.
355. Id.
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and was
and stressed that because the claim originated in Florida
56
reduced to a judgment there, jurisdiction was proper.3
Justice Brandeis concluded the opinion by emphasizing that
the United States properly intervened in Florida in order to
prevent the assets there from being applied in payment of local
claims which they believed to be subordinate to its own; there was
no rule of law which precluded the United States from asserting
its priority in an appropriate proceeding in any jurisdiction in
which property of the insolvent was being administered. 57 The
Florida court did not lack power to entertain the United States'
application. 3' The fact that the claim originated in Florida and
was reduced to judgment there made it appropriate that the
government should seek satisfaction in Florida, from funds
deposited there to assure payment of judgments entered on surety
bonds given there by the surety company. 59 Finally, there was no
good reason suggested why the United States should be denied the
right to secure payment of its debt in the proceeding.3°
36 1
EE.1939: United States v. Marxen

The Federal Housing Administrator issued a policy insuring a
bank against non-payment of its loans under the provisions of the
National Housing Act." One of the bank's customers defaulted on
3
its loan from the bank and filed for bankruptcy protection. 6
Rather than filing a claim in bankruptcy, the bank made demand
upon the Administrator for payment.3 ' The Administrator paid
the bank, and upon receiving an assignment from the bank of its
claim on the note, filed a claim in the bankruptcy proceeding in
the name of the United States. 35 The issue became whether the
Administrator's claim was entitled to priority under Rev. Stat.
Since the rights of creditors were fixed by the
§ 3466.3
Bankruptcy Act as of the date on which the petition in bankruptcy
was filed, the Court answered the issue in the negative. 367 The
356.
357.
358.
359.
360.
361.
362.
363.

Id. at 551-52.
Id. at 552.
Id.
Id.
Id.
307 U.S. 200 (1939).
Id. at 201.
Id.

364. Id.
365. Id. at 202.
366. Id.
367. Id. at 207. The date of filing the Petition in Bankruptcy is significant in
identifying the bankrupt's debts, even though under the Bankruptcy Act of
1898 the subject of the proceeding was not adjudicated a "bankrupt" until a
later date, whereas under the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 upon the filing
of the Petition in Bankruptcy the subject of the proceeding automatically
becomes a "debtor" in bankruptcy. CHARLES JORDAN TABB, THE LAW OF
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Court's opinion concluded by stating:
We are of the view that § 3466 is inapplicable to general claims in
bankruptcy transferred to the United States, or to which it has
become subrogated on payment, after the filing of the petition, for
the reason that the rights of creditors are fixed by the Bankruptcy
Act as the filing of the petition in bankruptcy. This is true both as
to the bankrupt and among themselves. The assets at that time are
segregated for the benefit of creditors. The transfer of the assets to
someone for application to "the debts of the insolvent, as the rights
and priorities of creditors may be made to appear," takes place as of
that time.36
FF.1941: United States v. Emory3"
In Emory, a corporation defaulted on a note it had given to a
bank as evidence of a loan."' The bank endorsed the note and
delivered it to the Federal Housing Administration, acting on
behalf of the United States under a contract of insurance and
guaranty provided by Title I of the National Housing Act.3 ' The
United States, through the Federal Housing Administration,
reimbursed the bank for the balance due on the note.372 Employees
of the corporation sought unpaid wages and the appointment of a
receiver in state court on the ground that their employer was
hopelessly insolvent.373 A receiver was appointed and took control
of the corporation's property, the total value of which was
$678.00.' 7
The wage claims were slightly in excess of that
amount, and the indebtedness to the United States was greatly in
excess thereof.3 75 The wage claimants sought priority on the basis
of a state statute, and the United States sought priority on the
basis of Rev. Stat. § 3466.376 Procedurally, the state appellate
court ruled under the Priority Statute the United States would
have been entitled to priority, but the United States lost its

BANKRUPTCY § 1.15 (1997).
368. Marxen, 307 U.S. at 207-08 (quoting Bramwell, 269 U.S. at 490). The

Court would not consider the question of whether Congress through the
National Housing Act intended to give the Housing Administration an identity
separate and apart from that of the United States, restricting its inquiry to a
claim that was effectively assigned to the Administration by the claimant in
fact. Id. at 203.
369. 314 U.S. 423 (1941).
370. Id. at 424.
371. Id.
372. Id.
373. Id.
374. Id.
375. Id.
376. Id. at 424-25.
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priority by Congress' enactment of § 64(a) of the Bankruptcy Act of
1898.3,7
Upon granting certiorari, the Supreme Court analyzed the
three United States Bankruptcy Acts.31 8 Finding the earlier Acts
had not altered the Priority Statute, the Bankruptcy Act of 1898,
the one then in force, had indeed altered the priority of claims in
favor of the United States, possibly giving wage claims priority
over the United States. 7 9 The Court then had to determine
whether Congress had intended this ranking of claims to apply to
non-bankruptcy cases. 8 ' On the basis of some scholarly writing
and the fact that the Bankruptcy Act made it clear that the word
"court" referred to the Bankruptcy Court, it was determined
Congress did not extend the Bankruptcy Act's ranking of claims to
matters handled by non-bankruptcy courts."'
The last point of inquiry addressed by the Court was whether
the National Housing Act evinced Congress' intent to create an
exception to priority of the United States in connection with home
loans.382 Finding that priority of the United States was not altered
by the Housing Act, which was passed only to stimulate the
building trades and increase employment, the Court held Congress
did not intend that the United States lose it rights under the
Priority Statute.'
377. Id. at 426-27.
378. Id. at 428 (referring to the Bankruptcy Acts of 1800, 1841, and 1867).
379. Id.
380. Id.
381. Id. at 428-29.
382. Id. at 429-30.
383. Id. at 430. The opinion, by the following words, left no doubt as to the
United States first priority:

In order to induce banks and other lending institutions to get the
program under way, Congress promised that the United States would

make good up to 20% on the losses they might incur on such loans. As
between the Government and the lending institutions, it was clearly
intended that the United States should bear the losses resulting from
defaults. But beyond this we may not go. There is nothing to show a

further intention that the United States should relinquish its priority as
to claims against defaulting and insolvent borrowers whose notes it
takes up from the lending institution pursuant to the insurance
contract. That is, the ultimate collection of bad loans was consigned to

the United States rather than to the lending institutions, but the
collecting power of the United States was neither abridged nor qualified.

Id.
The Court added: "Only the plainest inconsistency would warrant our
finding an implied exception to the operation of so clear a command as that of
§ 3466." Id. at 433. The Court repeated this pronouncement in United States
v. Moore, 423 U.S. 77, 82-83 (1975), Small Business Admin. v. McClellan, 364
U.S. 446, 453 (1960), Massachusetts v. United States, 333 U.S. 611, 634 (1948),
U.S. Dep't. of Agric. v. Remund, 330 U.S. 539, 544-45 (1947), and Illinois ex rel
Gordon v. United States, 328 U.S. 8, 11 (1946). See also In re Estate of
Berretta, 426 A.2d 1098 (Sup. Ct. Pa. 1981). The Supreme Court of

2006]

The PriorityStatute

1245

Justice Reed dissented,"u joined by Justices Roberts, Douglas,
and Jackson.385 Justice Reed posited that the National Housing
Act was not a revenue statute, and while there was no legislative
history as to whether Congress considered its impact on the
Priority Statute, its whole purpose reflected an intention on the
part of Congress that any monetary losses were to be borne by the
government; hence, Rev. Stat. § 3466 should not have applied to
the case." He further added that each time the Court considered
the legislative purpose of Rev. Stat. § 3466 in relation to
governmental claims under public financial legislation affecting
creditors competing with the government, it had determined that
Rev. Stat. § 3466 did not apply.387
GG.1941: United States v. Texas 88

In the same year as the Emory decision, the Court decided
Texas, in which the holder of a promissory note and mortgage sued
the maker, manufacturer, and distributor of motor fuel alleging a
default, and that the value of the business was insufficient to pay
the indebtedness on the note.3 89

A receiver was asked for,

appointed, and authorized to sell the manufacturer's equipment.3"
Another note holder intervened, as did the State of Texas and the
United States, seeking payment of state and federal claims
respectively. 9' The trial court found that the United States was
entitled to priority, pursuant to Rev. Stat. § 3466, and that
nothing was to be paid to Texas. 392

The Texas Supreme Court

reversed and set the hierarchy as: Texas first, the assignee of the
notes second, and the United States third.393 The United States

Pennsylvania affirmed the lower court decision that the Federal Tax Lien Act
(26 U.S.C. § 6323) impliedly repealed the Priority Statute with regard to
federal taxes. Id. at 1102. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania was evenly
divided - three on each side - and so the opinion was issued per curiam. Id.
at 1097.
The opinion issued in support of affirming the lower court
distinguished Emory on the basis that, unlike the National Housing Act, the

Federal Tax Lien Act contained a specific provision subordinating tax claims
of the United States to non-federal claims. Id. at 1102-03. The opinion in
support of reversal cited Emory as authority for the priority of the federal
claim. Id. at 1109. However, in the only reported decision discussing In re
Estate of Beretta, the District Court in Carter v. Carterheld to the contrary.
681 F.Supp. 323, 329 (E.D. Va. 1988).
384. Emory, 314 U.S. at 433 (Reed, J., dissenting).
385. Id. at 440.

386. Id. at 435-36.
387. Id. at 437.
388. 314 U.S. 480 (1941).

389.
390.
391.
392.
393.

Id. at 481.
Id. at 481-82.
Id. at 482.
Id.
Id.
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Supreme Court reversed, finding that, even though there was a
state statute providing that gasoline taxes payable by a distributor
shall be a preferred lien on all of the distributor's property, the
state's claim, similar to the state's claim in Maclay,394 was at most,
inchoate. 95 The court noted that Thelusson, Conard, and Brent, all
held that there is an exception to the priority of the United States
as to previously executed mortgages, based on the theory that at
the time of the mortgage the property passed to the mortgagee.396
Brent, however, reserved ruling on the issue of whether a specific
and perfected lien would defeat the priority of the United States. 7
Thelusson had made it clear that a general judgment lien did not
take precedence over claims of the United States unless an
execution on the judgment has proceeded far enough to take the
collateral out of the debtor's possession.39 In this case though, the
state had made no move to assert the lien proclaimed in the
aforementioned statute prior to the appointment of the receiver."'
In the end, the Court rejected the argument that the Texas statute
created its own lien by declaring that the lien affected only the
property of the distributor used in its business, as the language
was neither "specific" nor "constant."4 °" More important, however,
was the fact that the claim was "unliquidated" and "uncertain,"
since the lienor failed to take the final step of fixing the amount of
the claim.4"1
HH.1945: United States v. Waddill, Holland & Flinn,Inc.0 2
In Waddill, Holland & Flinn, the proprietor of a restaurant
made an assignment for the benefit of creditors.4 "°
After the
trustee/assignee sold the restaurant property, four creditors
claimed priority of payment: the United Statesj the State of
394. See supra notes 326-338 and accompanying text.
395. Texas, 314 U.S. at 488. Justice Marshall stated in Kimbell Foods, that

"it has proved difficult for nonfederal lienors to satisfy the strictures of the
choateness test." 440 U.S. at 721 n.8.
396. Texas, 314 U.S. at 484-85. It is common knowledge that this theory of
the title of mortgaged property passing to the mortgagee is applicable only in

"title" states, where a mortgage conveys title to the collateral from the
borrower to the lender. It does not apply in "lien" states, where the mortgage
gives the lender a lien against his collateral and there is no change of title.
397. Texas, 314 U.S. at 485.
398. Id. The Supreme Court's decision, although bound by the Texas courts'
rulings regarding Texas statutes which govern levy, seizure, and sale of
property belonging to delinquent taxpayers, was not affected by state statute,
as to who was entitled to priority of payment.
399. Id. at 486.
400. Id. at 487.
401. Id.
402. 323 U.S. 353 (1945).
403. Id. at 353-54.
404. See id. at 354 (claiming federal unemployment compensation taxes, and
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the City of Danville, which distrained on the
Virginia,"
restaurant property,"' and the landlord.' ' The State conceded its
claim was subordinate to that of the United States.' °8 The state
court, pursuant to a request for a determination of priority made
by the trustee/assignee, ruled that the City of Danville primed all
claimants, the landlord was second, and the United States and the
The Virginia appellate court
State shared third place. 4°
affirmed. 41 The United States Supreme Court, however,
reversed.41'
During the Court's review, it determined that on its face, Rev.
Stat. § 3466 admitted no exceptions to the priority of the United
States, but that Supreme Court decisions had recognized that
certain exceptions could be read into it:4 ' "The question has not
been expressly decided, however, as to whether the priority of the
United States might be defeated by a specific and perfected lien
upon the property at the time of the insolvency or voluntary
assignment."4 3 The Court hinted that such an exception, if it
existed, would have caused the Court to affirm the lower court's
Nonetheless, the Court did not answer the question
decision.
because neither the lien of the landlord nor the municipality was
"sufficiently specific and perfected on the date of the voluntary
assignment to cast any serious doubt on the priority of the claim of
the United States." ' The Court noted that Virginia state courts
had ruled that under its statutes the landlord has "a lien which is
fixed and specific, and not one which is merely inchoate .... 416
However, in response to this point the Court couched the following
words:

These interpretations of the Virginia statutes, as propositions of
state law, are binding. But it is a matter of federal law as to
whether a lien created by state statute is sufficiently specific and
perfected to raise questions as to the applicability of the priority
given the claims of the United States by an act of Congress. If the
priority of the United States is ever to be displaced by a local
statutory lien, federal courts must be free to examine the lien's
actual legal effect upon the parties. A state court's characterization
a debt for a Federal Housing Administration transaction).
405. See id. (claiming state unemployment compensation taxation).
406. See id. (claiming personal property taxes).
407. See id. (claiming rent).
408. Id.
409. Id. at 354-55.
410. Id. at 355.
411. Id. at 360.
412. Id. at 355.
413. Id. The Court referenced Conard, Brent, County of Spokane, Maclay,
Knott, and Texas in relation to this point.
414. Id. at 359.
415. Id. at 356.
416. Id.
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of a lien as specific and perfected, however conclusive as a matter of
state law, cannot operate by itself to impair 41or
7 supersede a longstanding Congressional declaration of priority.
Relying on federal precedent, the Court found that even if a
landlord's lien existed in the case, it was not sufficiently "specific
and perfected" 18 or "specific and ascertainable," 9 to qualify as an
exception to the Priority Statute.
As to the lien of the municipality, the Court held that under
Virginia law a municipal tax conferred a lien on personal property
only if an assessment was specifically made on such property.42 °
The trial court recognized the rule, but held that assessment of the
furniture and equipment as a unit was sufficient to satisfy this
rule "so long as they remained on the premises where the owner's
business was conducted." 2 ' In this case, the city tax collector did
not restrain the property until thirteen days after the voluntary
assignment for the benefit of creditors. 2 2 During this thirteen-day
period, it was uncertain whether the furniture and equipment
would remain intact. 422 This prompted the Court to opine: "Such a
lien cannot be said to be so explicit and perfected on the date of the
voluntary assignment as to fall within the claimed exception to the
priority of the United States."424 Justice Jackson dissented in this
case on the ground stated by the Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals.425
II.

1946: Illinois ex rel. Gordon v. United States426

The Illinois Supreme Court awarded priority to claims of the
United States under Rev. Stat. § 3466 against a taxpayer, who
while insolvent made an assignment of all his property for the
benefit of creditors.427 The claims were for federal unemployment
417. Id. at 356-57.
418. Id. at 357.
419. Id. at 358.
420. Id. at 359.
421. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). While the Court did not
explain, there must have been a concept of relation-back in the lower court's
rationale.
422. Id.
423. Id.
424. Id. at 360. See also supra note 396.
425. Id. at 360. In the view of the Virginia Supreme Court:
[Ihf before the Government's right of priority attaches, a creditor
acquires a specific and perfected lien on the property of the insolvent
debtor, the estate of the latter is, for all practical purposes, diminished
to the extent of the claim secured by such lien, and the Government's
right attaches only to the residue.
Waddill, Holland & Flinn, Inc., 28 S.E.2d at 743 (referring to Brent for
authority).
426. 328 U.S. 8 (1946).
427. Id. at 9.
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compensation taxes and federal insurance contribution taxes
under the Social Security Act then in effect."2 8 The State argued
that the Social Security Act evinces, implicitly rather than
explicitly, a Congressional "purpose" to free state unemployment
tax claims from Rev. Stat. § 3466.429 The State further argued that
the enforcement of priorities would weaken state unemployment
compensation funds and frustrate the manifest purpose of
Congress to promote, in the national interest, "sound financial and
stable" state unemployment systems.430
The Supreme Court, in an opinion authored by Justice Hugo
Black,4 11 agreed with the State that the social security legislation
provided a method of promulgating state and federal
unemployment relief systems and that sound state systems were
essential to the success of the Congressional plan. 2 The Court
observed, however, that the underlying philosophy of the Social
Security Act was to keep the state and federal systems separately
administered. 3 It nowhere indicated a purpose of treating a state
unemployment claim as tantamount to a claim of the United
44
States.
The Court indicated that federal social security taxes
were subject to other provisions of law relating to the assessment
and collection of taxes, unless such provisions were inconsistent
with the Social Security Act."
Those provisions indicated that
Congress intended, so far as practicable, to apply to social security
taxes all of the remedies available to the federal government in
collecting other taxes; and Rev. Stat. § 3466 was simply one of
those remedies."
JJ. 1946: Illinois ex rel. Gordon v.Campbell" 7
In the following Term, but in the same year, the Court
considered some matters not taken up in the previously decided
case of Illinois ex rel. Gordon v. United States.38 The Director of
Labor for the State of Illinois sued Chicago Waste & Textile Co. to
enforce a statutory lien for unemployment compensation
contributions.4 39 A company, Associated Agencies, was made a
defendant in the Director's suit."0
The Director alleged that
428.
429.
430.
431.
432.
433.
434.
435.
436.
437.
438.
439.
440.

Id.
Id. at 9-10.
Id. at 10.
Id.
Id. at 11.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
329 U.S. 362 (1946).
Id. at 364.
Id.
Id.
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Associated was a judgment-creditor of Chicago Waste & Textile,
who had executed a judgment against its debtor, and that
Associated's claim was subordinate to the Director of Labor
because its execution was effected long after the recording of the
Director's Notice of Lien." 1 It was further alleged that Chicago
Waste & Textile was insolvent, and a receiver was subsequently
appointed."2 Thereafter, the Collector of United States Internal
Revenue filed a claim in the action seeking priority for federal
insurance contributions and federal unemployment taxes, to which
the state Director of Labor objected."' Upon the receiver's sale of
the debtor's property, the proceeds were deposited into the court
registry, and the court ordered that ninety percent of the proceeds
be paid to the state, and ten percent be paid to the United
States.4 ' During the state proceedings, the Illinois Supreme Court
reversed, holding the United States was entitled to complete
priority."5
Before the Supreme Court, Illinois argued that Rev. Stat.
§ 3466 did not apply because the receiver appointed by the trial
court was not a "receiver" under the Bankruptcy Act's definition of
an "act of bankruptcy,"" 6 which required a "general" receivership
rather than one incidental to the enforcement of a lien.447 The
Court, however, did not need to consider the point since it
concluded that it was a "general" receivership within the purview
of Rev. Stat. § 3466. 4 The State further argued that Chicago &
Waste Textile was not insolvent." 9 In response, the Court dictated
that the State should have been estopped from questioning the
issue since the receiver was appointed under the State's petition;
and, moreover, the record established insolvency. 4 ° For the State's
final argument, the Court observed that on several occasions it
had reserved ruling on the issue of whether a fully perfected and
specific lien would defeat the United State's priority rights,"' and
issue since the
found again that the Court need not decide the
4 2
specific."
and
perfected
"fully
not
was
lien
instant
The Court reiterated seven previously established rules.
First, the effect and operation of a lien in relation to the United
441. Id. at 364-65.
442. Id. at 365.
443. Id. at 365-66.
444. Id. at 366.
445. Id.
446. Id. at 368.
447. Id.
448. Id. at 369.
449. Id. at 368.
450. Id. at 369.
451. Id. at 370 (referring to Conard, Brent, County of Spokane, Maclay,
Texas, and Waddill, Holland & Flinn,Inc.).
452. Id. at 370-71.
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State's claim of priority is always a federal question. "53 Second, the
priority given to the United States cannot be impaired or
superseded by state law." Third, a state's characterization of a
lien as specific and perfected was not conclusive.455 Fourth, and in
contrast, a state's characterization of its lien as inchoate was
Fifth, the recording of a notice of lien
practically conclusive."'
does not fully perfect the lien where, as in the present case, the
State did not know the amount owed by the debtor, or the type of
property belonging to the debtor to which the lien is to attach as of
that time.6 7 Sixth, the appointment of a receiver was only an
initial step in the perfection of a lien under state law. ' Seventh,
there were three requirements for a lien to be perfected at the time
the United States acquires its priority: (1) "identity of the
lienor;" 459 (2) "the amount of the lien";460 and (3) "the property to
which [the lien] attaches." 6' Further, regarding this last rule, "[iut
is not enough that the lienor [had] power to bring these elements,
or any of them, down from broad generality to the earth of specific
identity."462 As applied to the present case, the Court noted here
that the notices of lien and state statute made the identity of the
The
lienor certain before the government's priority attached.'
notices also fixed the amount of the liens, though miscalculated in
Yet, neither the notices nor the appointment of the
this case.'
receiver made definite and certain what property was being
Justice Rutledge's' concluding paragraph made
encumbered.'

453. Id. at 371.
454. Id.
455. Id.
456. Id.
457. Id. at 372-73. As the Court pointed out, the debtor files a schedule of its
property after the Notice is recorded, and until that schedule is filed the state
has no idea of what property the debtor possesses. Id. at 374.
458. Id. The appointment, together with the injunction protects whatever
rights in the property that the state may have. Id. However, "it [is] not a final
assertion or attachment of rights to specific property," as exists, for example,
in the case of an execution and levy. Id. (citing Conard,26 U.S. 386).
459. Id. at 375.
460. Id.
461. Id.
462. Id.
463. Id.
464. Id.
465. Id. ("'property devoted to or used in his business.., is neither specific
nor constant.'" (quoting United States v. Texas, 314 U.S. 480, 487 (1941))).
Goods subject to the lien had not been severed from the general and free
assets of the tenant/owner from which the claims of the United States were
entitled to priority. Id. at 375-76. As in Maclay, there was "merely 'a caveat of
a more perfect lien to come.'" Id. at 376. As in Thelusson and Maclay, the
State had acquired neither title nor possession. Id. Since the Receiver's
possession was that of the court, not of the state, and did not sever the liened
property from the debtor's general assets as of the crucial date - the date on
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crystal-clear the position taken by the Court, and the reason
therefore:
To permit the recording of the notices or the receiver's appointment,
or both, in circumstances like these, to overcome the Government's
priority would be in substance to overrule the numerous decisions
cited in which liens no less "specific and perfected" have been held
impotent for that purpose. It would open the door, too, we think, to
substantial nullification of the Government's priority. For then this
could be accomplished simply by recorded notices of lien, disclosing
claims to property not segregated from the debtor's general estate;
designated only by general words of classification, including afteracquired property as here; and ascertainable definitively only by
further procedures. Congress alone should make such a change, if it
should be made at all. 7
Joined by Justice Jackson,"
Justice Reed dissented.4 9
Justice Reed posited that the State's Notice of Lien was
sufficiently specific.4 ° Justice Reed further dissented on the
ground that the holding in Texas' was distinguishable from the
facts in this case, contrary to the majority's view. He observed
that it was true that the description of the property was the same
as that in Texas (i.e. the personal property owned and operated by
the debtor at his place of business), however, in his opinion the
fault of the lienor in Texas lie not in the property description, but
in the fact that the lienor failed to take the final step of fixing the
amount of the claim.472 Justice Reed argued that the lienor in this
case had taken that final step.473

KK.1947: U.S. Departmentof Agriculture v. Remund474
During the depression, Congress passed legislation creating
the Farm Credit Administration, to lend money to farmers so they
could purchase supplies for growing crops.
A South Dakota
farmer received such a loan from the Farm Credit Administration
in the amount of $370.00. 41 6 The farmer died without having

which the United States acquired its priority - the State's lien could not
prime the federal priority. Id. See also infra notes 736-737 and accompanying
text for an explaination of when the United States acquires priority.
466. Campbell, 329 U.S. at 364.
467. Id. at 376.
468. Id. at 378 (Jackson, J., joining in the dissent).
469. Id. at 376 (Reed, J., dissenting).
470. Id. at 377. The name and address of the creditor were given, as was the
amount of the claim. Id.
471. See supra note 400 and accompanying text.
472. Campbell, 329 U.S. at 378 (Reed, J., dissenting).
473. Id.
474. 330 U.S. 539 (1947).

475. Id. at 540.
476. Id.
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repaid the debt. Because his estate had insufficient funds with
which to pay all his debts, the Farm Credit Administration filed a
claim in probate court seeking priority under Rev. Stat. § 3466."' 7
The probate court denied the claim for priority; an intermediate
appellate court, as well as the South Dakota Supreme Court
affirmed.47
The South Dakota Supreme Court had taken the
position that giving priority to the United States would have
conflicted with the holding of Guaranty Trust Co. that giving
priority to the collection of loans owed to railroads during World
War I would be contrary to protection of railroads in time of war,
the purpose of the statute under which the loan was made.479
Before addressing the contention under Guaranty Trust Co.,
the Court opined on two other points. First, an argument was
made that the Farm Credit Administration could not claim
priority, as it was an entity separate and apart from the United
States." ° The Court rejected this contention, as the Administration
was simply one of many administrative units of the U.S.
government established to carry out the functions delegated by
Congress."' According to the Court, the Administration had none
of the features of a government corporation with an identity
separate and apart from the United States."2 Secondly, it made no
difference that the claim was filed in the name of the agency (or
for that matter, in the name of its authorized official), rather than
in the name of the United States, since the Acts under which the
agency was established were meant to give emergency relief to
distressed farmers, rather than to restore their credit status.'
As to the alleged conflict raised by the Guaranty Trust Co.
decision (i.e. giving emergency loans to farmers and seeking
priority in repayment), the Court said such priority in no way
impaired the aid which the farmers sought, nor would it have
embarrassed them in their daily operations.'
When considering
the conditions prevailing during the depression, moreover, there
was no indication that Congress meant its first lien, which it had
required in these loans, to be the sole security to which the
government could look for repayment.485

477. Id.
478. Id.
479. In re Buttke's Estate, 23 N.W.2d 281, 286-88 (S.D. 1946). See also
supra notes 316-325 and accompanying text.
480. Remund, 330 U.S. at 541.
481. Id.
482. Id.
483. Id. at 542-43.
484. Id. at 544.
485. Id. Justice Douglas dissented, without opinion, because he thought the
case was governed by Guaranty Trust Co. Id. at 545 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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In Massachusetts, liquidation of a debtor's assets subsequent
to a common law assignment for the benefit of creditors 7 yielded
an amount of money that was more than the federal government's
two claims under Titles 8 and 9 of the Social Security Act, and a
small amount for capital stock taxes.'
However, the liquidation
was insufficient to pay all three of the federal government's
claims.' 9
The State of Massachusetts had a claim for
unemployment taxes which was in between the two federal claims
in size. 490 The assignee paid the State's claim in full, and paid the
balance of the proceeds of the sale to the federal government in
satisfaction of its Title 8 claim. 491 The assignee did not pay the
remaining Title 9 or the capital stock claims.492 On appeal, the
district judge sustained federal priority for the capital stock tax
and the Title 8 claim, and for a payment of the ten percent balance
owed to the federal government on its Title 9 claim. 493 The basis
for the district judge's ruling as to the ten percent was that section
902 of Title 9 gave the assignee an "alternative right" to pay
ninety percent of a state's claim to an approved state
unemployment compensation fund, and receive credit for
"payment" of that amount to the federal government on its claim.9
According to the district judge, the Illinois cases4 5 had sustained
federal priority for the capital stock taxes and Title 8 claims, but
they had not ruled on Title 9 claims, as § 902 governed the issue. 491
The circuit court of appeals reversed the district judge on his
ruling vis-A-vis Title 9, and held that the United States was
entitled to priority for the full amount of all its claims. 97
In affirming the circuit court of appeals the Supreme Court
agreed that § 902 of Title 9 gave the assignee an "alternative
right" to take credit for ninety percent of any monies paid to an
approved state unemployment fund.499 The Court found, however,

486. 333 U.S. 611 (1948).
487. Id. at 613 n.1.
488. Id. at 612-13.
489. Id. at 613.
490. Id. at 613 n.1.
491. Id.
492. Id. The reason for not paying the claim for capital stock tax was
probably that there was not enough money in the proceeds with which to pay

it.
493. Id. at 613-14.
494. Id. at 614.
495. Illinois ex rel. Gordon v. United States, 328 U.S. 8 (1946), see supra
notes 426-436 and accompanying text, and Illinois ex rel. Gordon v. Campbell,
329 U.S. 362 (1946), see supra notes 437-473 and accompaniying text.
496. Massachusetts,333 U.S at 614 n.4.

497. Id. at 614.
498. Id. at 616.
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that the right was altered when the debtor was insolvent, because
Rev. Stat. § 3466 excluded Section 902.' " The Court gave several
reasons for taking this position. First, in Campbell the state court
did not reach the basic question of the force of Rev. Stat. § 3466 to
create priority for federal Title 9 claims - it expressly avoided
that issue.5" In the Illinois cases, the state court ruled that
federal claims for Titles 8 and 9 taxes are "debts" within the
purview of Rev. Stat. § 3466 and, therefore, are entitled to priority
over state claims."' The Court observed that its decisions in the
Illinois cases, "generally and without distinction" between Title 8
and 9, adjudicated priority for both types of claim."' The Court
further observed that prior Supreme Court decisions have held
that taxes due the United States are "debts" within the meaning of
Rev. Stat. § 3466.' 3 In the Illinois cases, the Court applied this
rule to Title 8 and Title 9 as against state claims for
contributions.5"
The Court next noted prior decisions holding that priority
attached as of the time of insolvency." 5 If, however, credit could be
taken after Rev. Stat. § 3466 attached ("i.e. after insolvency,
effective to set aside the federal priority up to ninety percent of the
Title 9 claim"), the priority to that extent becomes conditional, not
absolute: "Its effectiveness then becomes contingent upon the
happening of subsequent events... ."506 Not only the priority, but
the "debt" itself becomes contingent, and the "debts due" language
of Rev. Stat. § 3466 could be questioned." 7 The Court said it knew
of no application of Rev. Stat. § 3466 creating such "conditional
priority," nor did the majority of its members see how one could be
made consistently with Rev. Stat. § 3466's terms or purposes.5

If

§ 902 created an exception to Rev. Stat. § 3466, the Court
499. Id. at 628.

500. Id. at 620.
501. Id. at 621.
502. Id. at 622. The Court also pointed out that the decision in the Illinois
Supreme Court could have been made on the basis of the more narrow ground

that the Title 8 claim was more than sufficient to exhaust the fund and
therefore sustain the priority, for that claim alone would dispose of the case.

The decision could have rested on either the broad or the narrow ground. Id.
at 622-23.
503. Id. at 625, 625 n.24.
504. Id. at 625-26.
505. Id. at 626, 626 n.25.
506. Id. at 626.
507. Id. at 626-27. Congress intended debts to mean "debts," not "other
forms of obligation." Id. at 627 n.26. The Court's discussion of "debts" as a
specific exposition of that word can be disregarded in light of the 1982
amendment of the Priority Statute, changing "debt" to "claim." See supra note

44 and accompanying text. The amendment, however, did not cause the
Court's discussion to lose its value as statutory construction.
508. Massachusetts,333 U.S at 627.

1256

The John MarshallLaw Review

[39:1205

concluded that an exception would apply to all federal taxes, not
just those imposed by Title 9."
In further rejecting the State's arguments, the Court
expressed that the Illinois cases did not expressly discuss the "1090" percent distribution of Title 9 taxes, but this did not mean the
decisions did not encompass such a possibility.1 ° The decisions
extended generally to all cases where credit is sought after
insolvency. 11 In the Illinois cases, federal priority attached as of
the time of insolvency, and the Court adjudicated: "Our decision
held that right cut off by the incidence of § 3466 at the time of
insolvency."" 2
The Court lastly examined whether the Illinois decisions
should be overruled.513 Justice Rutledge," ' also the author of the
Illinois decisions, concluded that they should not be, expressing:
Until the federal claims for taxes, whether under Title 8, Title 9 or
other taxing provisions, are paid in full, the states are not entitled
either to collect or to retain any part of the insolvent debtor's assets.
We do not anticipate that any of the state unemployment insurance
programs will fail or be seriously impaired by reason of this
decision, or their consequent failure to secure the small sums
characteristically at stake in this extended litigation and,
apparently, in other cases most likely to produce similar
controversy. Nor would the Federal
Treasury have been rendered
51 5
bankrupt by a contrary result.
A scathing dissent was issued by Justice Jackson," 6 in which
he wrote: "This decision announces an unnecessarily ruthless
interpretation of a statute that at its best is an arbitrary one ...;
[t]he interpretation of the Priority Act to thus gouge [sic] the
states and private creditors is contrary to the purpose and spirit of
the Act itself."5 1 7 Justice Jackson reiterated Justice Story's
definition from over a century ago regarding the "motives of public
policy" underlying the federal priority statutes: "in order to secure
an adequate revenue to sustain the public burthens and discharge
the public debts .
,." Itwas obvious to Justice Jackson that the
ninety percent of Social Security tax involved was not
contemplated as federal revenue to meet federal burdens, but
509. Id. at 628.
510. Id. at 629.
511. Id.
512. Id.
513. Id.
514. Id. at 612. The other members of the five member majority were: Chief
Justice Vinson, and Justices Black, Murphy, and Reed. Id.
515. Id. at 634-35.
516. Id. at 635 (Jackson, J., dissenting).

Jackson was joined by Justices

Frankfurter, Douglas, and Burton. Id.
517. Id. at 635, 638.
518. Id. at 638. (citing State Bank of North Carolina,31 U.S. at 35).
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rather was laid to induce and to enable the State to assume
specific obligations to the unemployed.519 Justice Jackson ended by
expressing the belief that the priority statute was now being
invoked to deny, in this case, the aid promised in meeting those
obligations.520
MM.1950: United States v. Security Trust & Savings Bank

1

In this next case the Supreme Court applied the rule
established under the Priority Statute to a federal tax lien
statute.522 The plaintiff in a state lawsuit obtained a pre-judgment23
attachment under state law and thereafter recorded it.
Subsequently, the Internal Revenue Service recorded a tax lien;
subsequent to that, the plaintiff obtained a judgment lien by
recording a certified copy of his judgment.524 The state courts had
described the attachment lien as "a potential right or a contingent
lien."525 In the words of the U.S. Supreme Court, "[thus the
attachment lien is contingent or inchoate - merely a lis pendens
notice that a right to perfect a lien exists."5
In its reference to
Rev. Stat. § 3466 the Court opined, "it has never been held
sufficient to defeat the federal priority merely to show a lien
effective to protect the lienor against others than the Government,
527
but contingent upon taking subsequent steps for enforcing it."
The Court thereupon applied the same priority rule to the federal
tax lien statute, by holding:
If the purpose of the federal tax lien statute to insure prompt and
certain collection of taxes due the United States from tax
delinquents is to be fulfilled, a similar rule must prevail here.
Accordingly, we hold that the tax liens of the United States are
superior to the inchoate attachment lien .... 528
NN.1952: Nathanson v. N.L.R.B 529
In 1952, the Supreme Court determined that certain back pay
claims owed to former employees of a bankrupt as a result of an
unfair labor practice were not priority claims under Rev. Stat.

519. Id. at 638-39.
520. Id. at 639.
521. 340 U.S. 47 (1950).
522. Id. at 48.
523. Id.
524. Id. The judgment lien was obtained in the same action in which he
obtained the attachment.
525. Id. at 50 (ruling out application of any relation-back doctrine).
526. Id. The Court further described it as "a mere 'caveat' of a more perfect
lien to come." Id. (citingMaclay, 288 U.S. at 294).
527. Id. at 51.
528. Id.
529. 344 U.S. 25 (1952).
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§ 3466, because the claimants were simply private persons who
had been discriminated against by their employer.O The Court
distinguished the Bramwell case, " 1 which extended the United
State's priority to a claim for Indians' money, on the grounds that
the Indians were wards of the United States for whom this country2
was responsible for the continual protection of their interests.3
The wage claimants in Nathanson occupied no such status." 3
00.1953: United States v. GilbertAssociates, Inc.'
Gilbert Associates, Inc. involved a contest between a town in
New Hampshire and the United States, who both held general tax
liens on all of a taxpayer's personal property.s The debtor, while
insolvent, caused a receiver to be appointed, who sold all of the
debtor's personal property before the town ever took possession or
title thereto.u 6
The Supreme Court noted that this was another case in which
it would not answer the question as to whether a fully perfected
lien would trump the priority of the United States under Rev. Stat.
§ 3466, since the town did not perfect its lien. 7 Citing Thelusson,
the Court opined: "[I]n claims of this type, 'specificity' requires
that the lien be attached to certain property by reducing it to
possession, on the theory that the United States has no claim
against property no longer in the possession of the debtor. "us
Additionally, the Court relied on Texas as authority expressing,
"[wihere the lien of the Town and that of the Federal Government
are both general, and the taxpayer is insolvent, § 3466 clearly
awards priority to the United States."539

530. Id. at 27-28.
531. See supra notes 271-288 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
Bramwell case.
532. Nathanson, 344 U.S. at 28.

533. Id.
534. 345 U.S. 361 (1953).

535. Id. at 362.
536. Id.
537. Id. at 365.
538. Id. at 366 (citing Thelusson, 15 U.S. 336). In United States v. Kimbell
Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 721 n.8 (1979) Justice Marshall referenced Gilbert

when noting that "ithas proved difficult for nonfederal lienors to satisfy the
strictures of the choateness test."
539. Id. (citing Texas, 314 U.S. at 488).
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4
PP.1954: United States v. City of New Britain

This case involved a contest between a city, which held a
specific statutory tax lien 4' against certain real property, and the
federal government, which held a general tax lien 4' against the
same property owned by a solvent taxpayer.' The Supreme Court
held Rev. Stat. § 3466 did not apply, but rather that the "first in
time is the first in right" rule was applicable.5 " The Court found
that since the identity of the lienor, the encumbered property, and
the amount of the lien were established, there was nothing more to
be done for the city to have a choate lien." The city gained no
advantage over the federal government by the fact that its lien
was specific as "the State cannot on behalf of the City impair the
standing of the federal liens, without the consent of Congress."'"
The Court further commented that obviously Congress may
determine priorities between and among liens, but Congress did
not do so in the statute creating the federal tax lien."' It was said
Congress created federal priority under Rev. Stat. § 3466, which
the federal government may use against property of the debtor
wherever it is located.'
This broad reach of the federal priority
was determined to differ from the State's power, which is limited
to property located within its state's boundaries.'4 9 The application
of Rev. Stat. § 3466, however, was restricted to insolvent debtors,
and the debtor was found not to be insolvent. 559 Therefore, the
Court asserted that "the first in time is the first in right" rule was
applicable to the case."'
The city disagreed with the Court's position that the first-intime rule should apply, taking the state appellate court's position
that Congress by enacting I.R.C. § 3672 expressed the intention
that federal liens should be subordinated to such mortgages and
judgment liens as are described therein."' The city further argued
that the Federal position was subordinated to other encumbrances

540. 347 U.S. 81 (1954). City of New Britain was unanimously decided by
the same Court that decided Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 349 U.S.
294 (1954), also a unanimous decision.
541. City of New Britain, 347 U.S. at 84. The city's lien was for ad valorem
real property taxes and water rent. Id. at 83.
542. Id. at 84. The federal government's claim was for withholding and
unemployment taxes, as well as insurance contributions. Id. at 82.
543. Id. at 85.
544. Id.
545. Id. at 86-87.
546. Id. at 84.
547. Id. at 84-85.

548.
549.
550.
551.
552.

Id. at 85.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 87-88.
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as they have priority over mortgages and judgment liens. 3 The
Court disagreed, stating that the United States was not interested
in whether the State received its taxes and water rents prior to the
mortgage and judgment creditors."
The Court held that the
reason for its position was a matter of state law."' As to any funds
in excess of the amount necessary to pay the mortgage and
judgment creditors, however, the Court determined Congress
intended to assert the federal priority." The case was eventually
remanded to the state court for a determination of the priority of
the various liens asserted, in accordance with the Court's ruling in
the case.5 57
58
QQ. 1960: Small Business Administration v. McClellan'

In McClellan, The Small Business Administration (S.B.A.)"5 9
joined a private bank in making a loan to a borrower who became
bankrupt." The S.B.A. agreed to pay the bank one-quarter of the
money it collected from the bankrupt."' A question arose as to the
priority in favor of the United States under Rev. Stat. § 3466 and
the Bankruptcy Act.'
The Supreme Court held that the S.B.A. was entitled to full
priority,6 but not until it answered four issues raised in the case.
The first issue discussed was whether the S.B.A. was an entity
separate and apart from the United States, so as not to be entitled
to the United State's priority?' The Court found that the S.B.A.
was an integral part of the United States, so as to be entitled to
the priority of the United States. 5 ' The second issue was whether
553. Id.
554. Id. at 88.
555. Id.
556. Id.
557. Id. See United States v. Vermont, 377 U.S. 351, 354-55 (1964) (citing
City of New Britain, 347 U.S. at 86, in determining a conflict between tax
claims of the federal and state governments based on virtually identical
worded statutes involving a solvent taxpayer).
558. 364 U.S. 446 (1960).
559. Id. at 447. The S.B.A. was created in 1953 to protect, as far as possible,
the interests of small business concerns in order to preserve free competitive
enterprises and to maintain and strengthen the overall economy of the nation.

Id.
560. Id.
561. Id.
562. Id. 11 U.S.C. § 104 (§ 64 of the Bankruptcy Act), in existence at the
time of the case, gave the United States fifth priority among creditors of the
bankrupt. Id. at 447 n.5.
563. Id. at 453.
564. Id. at 448.
565. Id. at 450. The Court reminded its readers that in Remund priority was
given to the Farm Credit Administration, which was, as was the S.B.A., "'an
integral part of the governmental mechanism' created to accomplish what
Congress deemed to be of national importance." Id. (citing Remund, 330 U.S.
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Marxen governed.
In Marxen, the Court held that priority
attached only to those debts owing to the United States on the
date of commencement of the bankruptcy case, and not those that
came into effect after that date." The Court in McClellan held
Marxen did govern, as the case met Marxen's requirements, since
the debt was contracted nine months pre-bankruptcy, even though
the assignment of the note evidencing the loan to the S.B.A. was
not made until after the filing in bankruptcy. 67 The third issue for
the Court's resolution was whether the S.B.A. lost its right to
priority by agreeing to turn over / of the money it collected to the
private bank, since, per Nathanson, priority was not given to
collections for the benefit of private parties.'
The Court
distinguished Nathanson stating that no money would have gone
to the United States in that case, whereas in this case the money
would have gone to the government."'9 Furthermore, the fact that
the government would thereupon pay some of the money to a
private party was of no moment. ° It was true that the bank
would fare better than other creditors of the bank, but that was
the result of the bank's valid contract with the S.B.A., rather than
any inequality of distribution.5 7 ' The fourth issue considered by
the Court was the argument that giving the S.B.A. priority would
make it more difficult for small businessmen to borrow money
from other lenders who know that they may be second best in their
collection attempts. 2 The Court had already rejected the same
argument in Emory, concluding that "only the plainest
inconsistency would warrant our finding an implied exception
to... so clear a command as that of § 3466;" and that the
argument did not establish such an inconsistency. 3
RR. 1964: United States v. Vermont"
The decision in this case involved a contest between a federal
tax lien based on federal statutes and a state tax lien identical to
the federal statutes.7 5 Similar to the situation in City of New
576
Britain, the claims in this case were against a solvent taxpayer.
Due to the solvency of the taxpayer, the Court ruled that the
at 542).

566. Id. See also supra notes 361-368 and accompanying text.
567. McClellan, 364 U.S at 450.
568. Id. at 451.

569.
570.
571.
572.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 452-53.
Id. at 453.

573. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
without opinion. Id. at 453.
574. 377 U.S. 351 (1964).

Justice Douglas dissented

575. Id. at 352.
576. Id. See also supra note 543 and accompanying text.
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Priority Statute did not apply, but Justice Potter Stewart,5"
author for the unanimous Court, made some clear pronouncements
on the statute before ruling:
When the debtor is insolvent, Congress has expressly given priority
to the payment of indebtedness owing the United States, whether
secured by liens or otherwise, by § 3466 of the Revised Statutes, 31
U.S.C. § 191. In that circumstance, where all the property of the
debtor is involved, Congress has protected the federal revenues by
imposing an absolute priority. Where the debtor is not insolvent,
Congress has failed to expressly provide for federal priority...
although the United States is free to pursue the whole of the
debtor's property wherever situated.578
SS. 1964: King v. United States579
A New Jersey corporation filed for a Chapter XI adjustment of
its debts under the Bankruptcy Act of 189800 The company's
President, King, was appointed as the distributing agent in the
proceeding."' Though a plan of reorganization was confirmed, the
bankrupt's indebtedness to the United States 2 was not provided
for and King only partially paid their claim.' As a result, priority
was sought under § 64 of the Bankruptcy Act, and Rev. Stat.
§ 3466, the Priority Statute.'
The Government thereupon sued
King personally under Rev. Stat. § 3467.8 The United States
District Court dismissed the complaint on the ground that a
distributing agent in bankruptcy was not an "executor,
administrator, or assignee or other person" within the meaning of
Rev. Stat. § 3467.586
The distributing agent, unlike those
mentioned in Rev. Stat. § 3467, was not a personal representative
of the debtor, but rather an arm and representative of the
Bankruptcy Court, without any discretionary powers, and who
merely follows the dictates of the court."
The Third Circuit
reversed, causing the U.S. Supreme Court to grant certiorari.8

577. Vermont, 377 U.S. at 351.
578. Id. at 358. The Court went on to find the state lien sufficiently choate
to prime the later-recorded federal lien. Id. at 359.
579. 379 U.S. 329 (1964).
580. Id. at 331.
581. Id.
582. Id. The cause arose out of the bankrupt's breach of contract concerning
a military arsenal. Id.
583. Id. at 332.
584. Id.
585. Id. at 333. See also supra text accompanyin note 38 for the language of
Rev. Stat. § 3467.
586. King, 379 U.S. at 333-34.

587. Id. at 334.
588. Id.
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By holding that Rev. Stat. § 3467 was applicable to suits
against the distributing agent of a bankruptcy case, the Court first
traced the history of 31 U.S.C. § 191, and discussed its raison
d'etre. 9 Two years after granting the federal government priority
under the Act of March 3, 1779, Congress established personal
liability for those who frustrated the Government's priority.59 The
Court asserted that the two statutes must be interpreted in pari
59
materia.
The Court chose not to articulate a general rule
concerning disbursing agents in bankruptcy cases, but rather to
decide that on the facts of the case, King possessed sufficient
powers to expose himself to personal liability for failing to honor
the United States with its full priority.5 92 The facts demonstrated
that as President of the bankrupt, King was certainly aware of the
United State's claim; he took an active role in the formulation of
the plan, which contained at least a reference to the Government's
claim; he was present at the confirmation hearing at which the
claim was discussed; and, he was one of the major distributees
under the plan.593 When the Court came to a close it formulated
this rule:
In these circumstances we think King was possessed of a sufficient
degree of control over the allocation among creditors of the assets in
his possession to give rise to responsibility under § 192 for seeing
that the government priority was paid, a responsibility which King,
so far as the record reveals, made no effort to discharge. This is not
to say that King acted dishonestly in any way
594 or that he positively
intended to thwart the Government's claim.
Although King may have had an honest belief that the
Government would be paid in full, the Court held, "§ 192 required
more of King than an honest belief that the Government would be
paid. It imposed on him a duty to see that this was done."595
96
TT. 1970: United States v. KeyS

In Key, The Court announced that the Priority Statute and
the Bankruptcy Act of 1898597 were compatible, and a plan of
589.
590.
591.
592.
593.
594.
595.

Id. at 334-35.
Id. at 335.
Id. at 336.
Id. at 339-40.
Id. at 339.
Id.
Id. at 339-40.

596. 397 U.S. 322 (1970).
597. The Bankruptcy Act of 1898 was repealed by the Bankruptcy Reform
Act of 1978, effective October 1, 1979, which presently furnishes most of the
statutory law dealing with bankruptcy in the United States (popularly
referred to as "the Code"), under Title 11 of the United States Code. It is
unclear whether the 1898 Bankruptcy Act still furnishes the only extant
definition of "acts of bankruptcy," as that statute has been repealed. See infra
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reorganization in bankruptcy that did not comply with the Priority
Statute could not be confirmed. 598 A liquidation plan 5" was
proposed in a Chapter X case" ° under which the bankrupt's main
asset was to be sold, and the down payment used to satisfy certain
wage claims as well as state and local tax claims in full. 1 The
United States objected to the deferred payment plan, arguing that
the plan violated the Priority Statute. 6 2
The Trustee in
Bankruptcy (Key) took the position that the Priority Statute did
not apply to Chapter X cases, as the Bankruptcy Act of 1898
exclusively governed that type of bankruptcy case."
Justice Thurgood Marshall wrote the opinion for a unanimous
Court.'
Justice Marshall reiterated the establishment of the
taxpayer's insolvency, and adhered to the Court's previous rule
that a tax due the United States was a debt."5 Since no provision
of the Bankruptcy Act governing Chapter X specifically excepted
corporations in reorganization from the Priority Statute, the
question to be decided by the Court was whether the legislative
scheme of Chapter X implied that such an exception was intended

notes 650-656 and accompanying text.
598. Key, 397 U.S. at 332-33.
599. A liquidation plan was permitted, though not the typical plan
contemplated, in reorganization under the prior (1889 Act), as well as under
the present bankruptcy statute. Under such a plan the debtor's property is
liquidated (i.e. all of its assets are sold and distributed to creditors), rather
than the being reorganized. See generally 11 U.S.C. § 1101(1). The reason for
liquidating in Chapter 11 (the reorganization chapter of the bankruptcy
statute) rather than in Chapter 7 (the chapter devoted to liquidations), is that
Chapter 7 liquidation will be performed under the supervision of a Trustee in
Bankruptcy, whereas under the reorganization chapter (the prior Chapter X or
the present Chapter 11), the debtor controls the liquidation, as the Debtor in
Possession ("D.I.P.").
600. Under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 Chapter X dealt with corporate
reorganizations, whereas Chapter XI dealt with arrangements of debts, the
former involving more restructuring of the bankrupt than the latter. CHARLES
JORDAN TABB, THE LAW OF BANKRUPTCY § 1.6 (1997).
601. Key, 397 U.S. at 333. The plan was to satisfy about twenty percent of
unsecured debt and about ten percent of United States taxes, the balance of
which was to be paid out in seventy-eight monthly installments, which the
bankrupt was to receive in payment for its principal asset. Id.
602. Id. at 323. At the time, the priority statute was codified as 31 U.S.C.
§ 191. Although in his opinion, Justice Marshall more often referred to the
statute as Revised Statute § 3466.
603. Id. at 327.
604. Id. at 322. Justice William 0. Douglas wrote a concurring opinion in
which he stressed the fact that the Chandler Act, which amended the
Bankruptcy Act, provided that any creditor who objected to a plan must be
dealt with in a "fair and equitable" manner. Id. at 333 (Douglas, J.,
concurring). Compromising the rights of senior creditors to protect junior
creditors was not "fair and equitable." Id. at 333-34 (Douglas, J. concurring).
605. Id. at 324.
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by Congress. 6 Recognizing that the statute was to be given a
liberal construction consonant with the public policy underlying
it, 7 Justice Marshall found that because the proposed plan did not
comply with the Priority Statute, it could not be confirmed.'
UU.1975: United States v. Moore'
In Moore, a contractor defaulted on his contracts with
government entities, and made an assignment to Moore for the
benefit of creditors, to which the federal government did not
consent. 1 ' Moore, as assignee, refused to accord priority to the
government's claims filed with him.61' The ninth circuit reversed
the district court's ruling, which had granted the United States
priority on the ground that at the time of the assignment the
amount of the claim was not certain, and hence, was not a "debt
due," as that term was used in the Priority Statute. 12
In reversing the circuit court, the Supreme Court stated three
reasons for not construing the Priority Statute narrowly."' First,
there was nothing on the face of the statute and no potential
difficulty in administration was requiring a distinction between
liquidated and unliquidated debts, since all that the statutes
provided was that "debts due the United States shall be first
satisfied."6 14 The language did not require the amount of the debt
be certain as of the date of the assignment if liability was
determined by that date, and the amount payable was determined
as of the date of payment."5 Second, all of the Bankruptcy Acts1
permitted proof of unliquidated claims, which would have been
allowed if they were liquidated or could be reasonably estimated
soon enough that the distribution of the estate would not be
unduly delayed.617 The Court proffered that a meaning more
restrictive than the bankruptcy statutes have given it for over 175
years would defeat the Priority Statute by unreasonably
606. Id.
607. Id. In contrast, in Emory the Court held that "only the plainest
inconsistency would warrant [a]finding of an implied exception to the
operation of so clear a command as that of§ 3466." 314 U.S. at 433.
608. Key, 397 U.S. at 324-34. The holding in this case was implicitly
overruled by the complete revamping of the bankruptcy system brought about
by the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978. See supra note 41 and accompanying

text.
609. 423 U.S. 77 (1975).

610.
611.
612.
613.

Id. at 78-79.
Id. at 79.
Id. 79-80.
Id. at 83.

614. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

615. Id. at 83.
616. See id. at 84-85 (referring to the Bankruptcy Acts of 1800, 1841, 1867
and 1898).

617. Id. at 85.
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restricting the application of the word "debts" within a narrow or
technical meaning.618 Third, the Court in King and National
Surety Co., and other Federal courts, 19 had regularly applied the
Priority Statute to debts that were, in fact, unliquified, although
without discussing the present issue." ° Chief Justice Burger"
concluded the Court's opinion on grounds of stare decisis,
emphasizing the practice had been to apply the Priority Statute to
unliquidated debts for so long a period of time that there were
"strong grounds for a liberal construction." 622
VV. 1998: United States v. Estate ofRomani'
In Estate of Romani, the Court considered the question of
whether a federal tax claim should be given preference over a
judgment creditor's perfected lien on real property even though
such preference is not specifically authorized by the Federal Tax
Lien Act of 1966.624 A corporation recorded a judgment it obtained
against an individual, acquiring a judgment lien under the laws of
the state where the judgment was rendered.6 5 Thereafter, the
Internal Revenue Service (I.R.S.) recorded notices of tax liens
against the judgment debtor's real property.2 6
When the
individual taxpayer died, the value of his estate was far less than
either the amount of the judgment or the tax liens.6 7 The estate
administrator sought permission of the probate court to transfer
the estate property to the corporate judgment creditor in lieu of
execution.2
The I.R.S. acknowledged that the judgment lien
primed its tax liens as a result of its being recorded prior to the
recording of the Tax Notice. 2 9 The I.R.S., however, claimed
priority on the basis of the Priority Statute, 37 U.S.C. § 3713.63
The lower state courts, including the state supreme court,6
618. Id. As stated above, the Court's discussion of "debts" as a specific
exposition of that word can be disregarded in light of the 1982 amendment of
the Priority Statute, changing "debt" to "claim." See supra notes 507 and
accompanying text. The amendment, however, did not cause the discussion to

lose its value for statutory construction.
619. See United States v. Brummer, 282 F.2d 535 (10th Cir. 1960) (applying
the Priority Statute to debts that were not liquidated); United States v.
Barnes, 31 F. 705 (S.D.N.Y 1887) (same).
620. Moore, 423 U.S. at 86.

621. Id. at 78.
622. Id. at 86.
623. 523 U.S. 517 (1998).

624.
625.
626.
627.
628.
629.
630.

Id. at 519.
Id. at 519-20.
Id. at 520.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

631. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court took the position that the Tax Lien
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disagreed with I.R.S.'s argument, and the United States Supreme
Court agreed, overruling two circuit courts of appeals decisions. 2
Justice Stevens wrote the opinion 3 for the unanimous
Court."4 In his opinion, Stevens first discussed Thelusson, which
gave the United States a preference over a creditor who had a
general lien on a debtor's real property."s
The Government
suggested that the decision could be viewed as holding the
statutory priority always accorded the federal government a
preference over judgment creditors."i However, for two reasons
the Court did not accept that interpretation."
First, in 1817,
when Thelusson was decided, there was no procedure for recording
a judgment and thereby creating a choate lien on real property."B
Second, and of greater importance, was Justice Story's explanation
of Thelusson in Conard. 9 In Conard, Justice Story pointed out
that in Thelusson the creditor had not perfected his title (by
execution or levy) on the judgment debtor's property."
All the
creditor had in Thelusson was a potential lien. 1 The Government
also relied on dicta from the decisions in Key, and Emory."2
Justice Stevens discounted such reliance because those cases

Act of 1966 modified the Priority Act by providing that federal tax liens "shall
not be valid" as against judgment creditors until a prescribed notice has been
given. Id. at 520. The U.S. Supreme Court did not explicitly accept or reject
the Pennsylvania court's analysis.
632. Id. at 521. The Circuit Court decisions overruled were Kentucky ex rel.
Luckett v. United States, 383 F.2d 13 (6th Cir. 1967), and Nesbitt v. United
States, 622 F.2d 433 (9th Cir. 1980). In its brief, the government argued that
the state Supreme Court's position not only conflicted with the two Courts of
Appeals' decisions, but also conflicted with the U.S. Supreme Court's decision
in Thelusson. Estate of Romani, 523 U.S. at 521; see also supra notes 75-86
and accompanying text. The Supreme Court disagreed.
633. Id. at 519.
634. Justice Scalia concurred, but disagreed with Justice Stevens' opinion to
the extent it recognized that in 1966 and 1970, Congress decided to disregard
the suggestion of the American Bar Association to subordinate the priority
statute to the Federal Tax Lien Act, Congress expressed its will. Id. at 535-36
(Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia believed that Congress expresses it will
by action, not inaction. Id. That Court was identical to the present Court
barring Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. succession as Chief Justice, and
Justice Samuel A. Alito's replacement of Justice Sandra Day O'Connor.
635. Id. at 526.
636. Estate of Romani, 523 U.S. at 527.
637. Id.
638. Id. Notwithstanding a judgment, a bona fide purchaser could have
acquired a debtor's property free from any claim of the judgment creditor. Id.
639. Id. at 528. See also supra note 99 and accompanying text (discussing
Justice Story's explanation of the Thelusson case in Conard, 26 U.S. 386
(1828)).
640. See supra note 99.
641. Estate of Romani, 523 U.S. at 528.
642. Id. at 528.
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involved completely unsecured claims, unlike the instant
situation.
Furthermore, the Court refused to take up the seemingly
interesting pursuit of deciding whether the Tax Lien Act of 1966
amended the Priority Statute, concluding it did not think it
appropriate to "view the issue in this case as whether the Tax Lien
Act of 1966 has implicitly amended or repealed the priority
statute. Instead, we think the proper inquiry is how best to
harmonize the impact of the two statutes on the Government's
power to collect delinquent taxes."6 The Court accomplished this
by examining how three statutes, other than the Tax Lien Act, had
impacted the Priority Statute without expressly amending it. 6"
Each of the identified statutes had effectively superseded the
Priority Statute, according to Supreme Court decisions.'
The
Court illustrated reasons for treating the Tax Lien Act of 1966 in
the same manner:
[Tihe Tax Lien Act is the later statute, the more specific statute,
and its provisions are comprehensive, reflecting an obvious attempt
to accommodate the strong policy objections to the enforcement of
secret liens. It represents Congress' detailed judgment as to when
the Government's claims for unpaid taxes should yield to many
different sorts of interests (including, for instance, judgment liens,
mechanic's liens, and attorneys' liens) in many different types of
property (including, for example, real property, securities, and
motor vehicles). Indeed, given our unambiguous determination that
the federal interest in the collection of taxes is paramount to its
interest in enforcing other claims, it would be anomalous to conclude
that Congress intended the priority statute to impose greater
burdens on the citizen than those specifically crafted for tax
collection purposes.6' 7
In other words, when the Federal Tax Lien Act of 1966 said that
"[tihe lien imposed by section 6321 shall not be valid as against
any purchaser, holder of a security interest, mechanic's lienor, or
judgment lien creditor until notice thereof which meets the
requirements of subsection (f) has been filed by the Secretary," it
meant just that. The government's later-filed tax lien was not
going to trump a prior-recorded judgment lien because the Priority

643. Estate of Romani, 523 U.S. at 529. The Court in Key, moreover, made it
clear that it was not deciding a secured-claim case. See supra notes 596-608

and accompanying text.
644. Estate of Romani, 523 U.S. at 530.

645. Id. at 530-31. The three statutes impacting but not amending the
Priority Statute were the National Bank Act, the Transportation Act of 1920,
and the Bankruptcy Act of 1898. Id.
646. Id. at 531.
647. Id. at 532 (internal citations omitted).
648. Id. at 521 n.3.
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Statute only gave the United States priority under different
circumstances."
IV.

HAVE THE "ACTS OF BANKRUPTCY" CHANGED WITHOUT
SUPREME COURT RECOGNITION?

It is very possible that the number of "acts of bankruptcy,"
one of which the debtor must have committed before the United
States will be entitled to priority under the Priority Statute has
been reduced from six under the 1976 amendment of the 1898
Bankruptcy Act to two under the Bankruptcy Reform Act of
1978.650 Indeed, a bankruptcy judge in California hearing a
bankruptcy case (not a Priority Statute case) believed the number
of "acts of bankruptcy" have been reduced." This is in opposition
to the position taken by a magistrate judge in Illinois, who thought
the "acts of bankruptcy" had been abolished; 2 as well as to the
position taken by a district court judge in Virginia, who stated that
"[w]hile the concept of an act of bankruptcy is no longer needed in
Title 11 law, it remains a vital part of the Insolvency [Priority]
Statute."' No appellate court to date has answered the question
649. The likely reason for the Court's not mentioning Sec. Trust & Sav. Bank
is that the judgment lien in that case had not been perfected. See supra notes
521-528 and accompanying text.
650. See supra note 6 (comparing the lists outlining "acts of bankruptcy").
651. See generally In re Marshall, 300 B.R. 507 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2003)
(deciding that a Petition may be filed by a debtor in Chapter 11, even though
the debtor was not insolvent at the time of filing). Judge Bufford said in
dictum, "The Bankruptcy Code, while reducing to two the acts of bankruptcy
that can support an involuntary petition continues to permit an involuntary
bankruptcy notwithstanding the debtor's solvency."
Id. at 519.
This
statement was dictum because the Petition filed in the case was a voluntary
one, rather than an involuntary one filed by a creditor.
652. See Budd Co. v. Applied Composite Corp., No. 02-C154, 2005 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 19090, at *9-10 (N.D. Ill. June 27, 2005) (recognizing that it is no
longer necessary for a creditor wanting to file an involuntary petition forcing a
debtor into bankruptcy to allege and prove the debtor had committed an act of
bankruptcy).
In Budd. Co., U.S. Magistrate Judge Martin C. Ashman
expressed this thought in a case in which the plaintiff sought to enforce a
settlement against a defendant which, instead of making payments to the
plaintiff made an assignment for the benefit of creditors. Id. The Magistrate
Judge's remarks about "acts of bankruptcy" were, therefore, obiter dicta.
Indeed, the intent of the statement relied on by Judge Ashman that "[tihe
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 abolished the concept of 'acts of bankruptcy"
was that it is no longer necessary for a creditor wanting to file a Petition
forcing a debtor into bankruptcy (i.e., an involuntary petition) to allege and
prove that the debtor committed an "act of bankruptcy." Id. (citing U.S. CODE
& ADMIN NEWS 1978, pp. 5787, 5820).
653. Carter, 681 F. Supp. at 326 n.13. In that case District Judge Ellis,
pursuant to the Priority Statute, gave the United States priority for its tax
claim, rather than following the Federal Tax Lien Act (26 U.S.C. § 6323),
because the government's attorneys plead, pursuant to the Priority Statute,
that the debtor while insolvent committed an act of bankruptcy. Id. at 326-27.
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regarding whether "acts of bankruptcy" still exist. The district
judge in Virginia was partially correct in saying that "the concept
of an act of bankruptcy is no longer needed in Title 11 law,"'
because unlike prior bankruptcy statutes it is no longer a
prerequisite to the bringing of an involuntary case against a
debtor, and the phrase "act of bankruptcy" is no longer physically
written into the present Bankruptcy Act. The concept of an "act of
bankruptcy," however, may still be needed in Title 11 law, because
if the debtor contests an involuntary petition, there must be a trial
on the issue of whether the petition was properly filed against the
debtor. The case will proceed against the debtor only if the court
finds that:
[Tihe debtor is generally not paying such debtor's debts as such
debts become due unless such debts are the subject of a bona fide
dispute as to liability or amount; orr 5
[W]ithin 120 days before the date of the filing of the petition, a
custodian, other than a trustee, receiver, or agent appointed or
authorized to take charge of less than substantially all of the
property of the debtor for the purpose of enforcing a lien against
such property, was appointed and took possession. 656
These subsections of the present Bankruptcy Act are what
prompted the bankruptcy judge in California to assert that the
number of "acts of bankruptcy" has been reduced to two." The
question is: are these statutory provisions "acts of bankruptcy?"
Neither of them were specified in the 1898 Bankruptcy Act as an
"act of bankruptcy," and they do not serve the function of those
specified "acts." An involuntary Petition in Bankruptcy could not
be filed against a debtor under the prior statutes unless the debtor
had committed one of those "acts." No such prohibition exists
under the present statute, which allows the creditor to file a
petition and get relief, unless the filing of the petition is
successfully contested by the debtor. It is only in the event of a
contest that these Code sections become operative. The creditor
will be permitted to continue with its bankruptcy case against the
debtor only if the court finds the debtor (1) is not paying debts as
they become due, unless those debts are the subject of a bona fide
dispute as to liability or amount, or (2) within 120 days of the
The Judge did not identify which "act of bankruptcy" the debtor committed.
654. Id. at 326 n.13.
655. 11 U.S.C. § 303(h)(1),
656. 11 U.S.C. § 303(h)(2). In In re Marshall, Bankruptcy Judge Bufford
noted that in his twenty years as a Bankruptcy Judge, only one of the 100,000
bankruptcy cases to have come before him was based on 11 U.S.C. § 303(h)(2).

300 B.R. at 519 n.24. This statistic suggests the major reason for granting the
creditor relief was a result of the debtor not paying debts as they become due,
a "cash-flow", and not a "balance-sheet" form of insolvency.

657. 300 B.R. at 519.
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filing a custodian of a particular type had been appointed or
authorized to take charge of less than a substantial portion of the
debtor's property for the purpose of enforcing a lien against the
debtor's property. Thus, the "act of bankruptcy" under prior
statutes served an entirely different function than the two Code
provisions which the bankruptcy judge in California believed are
"acts of bankruptcy." If the present Bankruptcy Code does not
designate "acts of bankruptcy," then the United States is relegated
to satisfying their prerequisite "act of bankruptcy" in order to
establish priority under the Priority Statute, as they were defined
in the Bankruptcy Act of 1898. That Act, however, has been
repealed. It would seem that this is a conundrum for the courts to
figure out, or perhaps for Congress to resolve.
V. IS THE

PRIORITY OF THE UNITED STATES THE EQUIVALENT OF A
"FLOATING LIEN?"

There remains a perplexing scenario which has not been
discussed by the Supreme Court in any of the cases referred to in
this article. The scenario involves the assignment of all of a
debtor's property for the benefit of creditors.'
Unless the debtor
has property at the time the United States' priority arises, there is
nothing to which the priority can attach. If the debtor assigns all
of his property while insolvent, priority, will spring into existence,
but because of the assignment, there will be nothing to which that
priority can attach. What happens to the priority? Does it remain
something similar to a "floating lien" until the debtor acquires
property to which the lien can attach, or does it expire because
there is nothing to keep it alive? It probably would not expire, for
in such a case there would be no distinction between assigning
property while solvent and assigning property while insolvent.
This is a matter for the courts to resolve.
VI. CONCLUSION

Priority Statutes had their beginnings in post-Hastings
England where the king was given a preference in the collection of
public monies. The preference was "founded not so much upon any
personal advantage to the sovereign, as upon motives of public
policy in order to assure adequate revenue to sustain public
burthens and discharge public debt. 9 Today, the object of giving
the sovereign priority is virtually the same; and the claim of
governments to priority rests entirely on statute.r' The first such
statute in the United States was enacted in 1789,"1 under
658.
659.
660.
661.

See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
State Bank of North Carolina,31 U.S. at 35.
Estate of Romani, 523 U.S. at 524.
See supra note 20 and accompanying text,
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Congress' constitutional power to do so." The precursors to the
present Priority Statute were enacted in 1797 and 1799.'
The
present Priority Statute in the United States appears as 31 U.S.C
§ 3713(a)-(b), and there has been virtually no material change'
from its beginnings, so that the early pronouncements of the
Supreme Court are still authoritative.
In essence, in order for a claim in favor of the United States
and against a "person"' to have unsecured first priority, three
prerequisites must be established: (1) the debtor must have been
insolvent at the time that person owed the debt," and (2) at least
one of the following events must have occurred: (a) the debtor
without enough property to pay all debts makes a voluntary
assignment of all of its property;' or (b) property of the debtor, if
absent, is attached;669 or (c) an act of bankruptcy is committed by
the debtor,67 ° and (3) the debtor must not be the subject of a
bankruptcy case."' In addition, if the representative of such a
debtor (except a trustee appointed under Title 11 of the United
States Code - the Bankruptcy Code), pays any part of such a debt
due to the United States before paying the United States, that
representative is personally liable to the extent of the payment for
unpaid claims of the United States. " In order for a claim in favor
of the United States and against "the estate of a deceased debtor"
to have unsecured first priority, three prerequisites must be
established: (1) the estate must be in the custody of an executor or
administrator;6 3 (2) the estate "is not enough to pay all debts of
the debtor";7 4 and (3) the estate must not be the subject of a
bankruptcy case.6 5 In addition, if the representative of such a
debtor's estate (except, again, a trustee appointed under Title 11 of

662. Lewis, 92 U.S. at 621; Fisher, 6 U.S. at 396.
663. See supra notes 27-32 and accompanying text.
664. Moore, 423 U.S. at 81; Emory, 314 U.S. at 428; Hoffman v. United
Welding & Mfg. Co., 102 A.2d 878, 880 (Conn. 1954).
665. The most significant change came in 1982 when the word "debt" in the
original statutes was changed to "claim". See supra text accompanying notes
43 and 44. This was not, however, a material change. The present
Bankruptcy Act defines "debt" as liability on a claim. 11 U.S.C. § 101(12).
"Claim" is defined as a "right to payment or a right to an equitable remedy for
breach of performance if such breach gives rise to a right to payment." 11

U.S.C. § 101(5).
666.
667.
668.
669.
670.
671.
672.
673.
674.
675.

Recall that a corporation is a "person." Beaston, 37 U.S. at 136.
State of Vermont, 377 U.S. at 358.
Estate of Romani, 523 U.S. at 519 n.1 (citing 31 U.S.C. § 3713).
Id.
Id.
Id.
31 U.S.C. § 3713(b).
31 U.S.C. § 3713(a)(1)(B).
Id.
Id.
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the United States Code - the Bankruptcy Code), pays any part of
such a debt due to the United States before paying the United
States, that representative is personally liable to the extent of the
payment for unpaid claims of the United States.
Justice Stephen Breyer wrote in his recent book, Active
Liberty: "the fact that members of historically different Supreme
Courts have emphasized
different constitutional themes,
objectives or approaches over time allows us to characterize a
Court during a period of its history and to speak meaningfully
about changes in the Court's judicial 'philosophy' over time." 7 '
Over the span of 193 years, it is significant that there has been
little disagreement among the eighty-seven different Supreme
Court Justices regarding interpretation and applicability of the
Priority Statute in the forty-eight cases that have interpreted the
applicability of the Priority Statute. Only one of those forty-eight
cases was overruled, and only implicitly, rather than explicitly. 68
Moreover, in only eight cases has there been a dissenting opinion
about the Priority Statute."' As a consequence, the Court has
made some very clear observations about the Priority Statute, and
fashioned some very specific rules about the following sixteen
subjects.
A. Conflict With Other Statutes
The Priority Statute offers the United States a remedy in the
collection of its unsecured claims against debtors. Certainly it is
not the only remedy at the disposal of the United States. There
are other remedies offered by other statutes and sometimes the
two statutes conflict. It has been observed that since the Priority
Statute, the purpose of which is to protect the United States as an
unsecured creditor, is general and comprehensive in its terms,
when it conflicts with another statute, such as the National
Banking Act, which is specific in protecting certain creditors, the
general and comprehensive Priority Statute will be applied, rather
than the more specifically structured statute. 6

676. 31 U.S.C. § 3713(b).
677. STEPHEN BREYER, ACTiVE LIBERTY 9 (2005).
678. The decision in Key was implicitly overruled by the passage of the
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978. See supra note 596.
679. See Beaston, 37 U.S. at 137 (Story, J., dissenting); Smythe, 188 U.S. at
178 (Peckham, J., dissenting); Emory, 314 U.S. at 433 (Reed J., dissenting);
Waddill, Holland & Flinn, Inc., 323 U.S. at 360 (Jackson, J., dissenting);
Campbell, 329 U.S. at 366 (Reed, J., dissenting); Massachusetts, 333 U.S. at
5454 (Douglas, J., dissenting); McClellan, 364 U.S. at 453 (Douglas, J.,
dissenting). Including the Justices who concurred in the dissenting opinions,
only ten of eighty-seven Justices (thirteen different Chief Justices) disagreed
with the majority opinion regarding the Priority Statute.
680. Cook County Nat'l Bank, 107 U.S. at 451.

1274

The John Marshall Law Review

[39:1205

B. Interference With State Sovereignty
Any interference with state sovereignty is not the fault of the
Priority Statute, but of the Supremacy Clause of the Federal
Constitution.6'
The Court has decided that Section 902 of the
Social Security Act, which allows a debtor to take credit against its
liability to the federal government for ninety-percent of all monies
paid to a state approved unemployment compensation fund, is
abrogated if the debtor is insolvent."2 In the event of the debtor's
insolvency, the Supreme Court has ruled that the Priority Statute
applies and the state loses its ninety percent of the debtor's
payment. 3
C. Recipient of Money Collected
Since the purpose of the Priority Statute is to allow this
country to be able to collect money to operate its government, for
the Statute to apply the federal government, and not some third
person, must receive the money collected," unless that third
person is considered a ward or beneficiary of the United States.'
D.

State PriorityStatutes

States can have Priority Statutes,6

but a state statute cannot

create a priority in favor of other creditors which supersedes the
priority of the United States. 7 State courts may be called upon to
rule on both the state and federal priority statutes.

681. Fisher, 6 U.S. at 397. See also supra notes 426-436 and accompanying
text for a summary of Illinois ex rel. Gordon. While there is no indication that
Congress had the Priority Statute specifically in mind while drafting the
Social Security Act, the provisions of the Social Security Act indicate that
Congress intended, so far as practicable, to apply to social security taxes all of
the remedies available to the federal government in collecting other taxes.
The Priority statute provides one of those remedies. Since it does not conflict
with the express language or purpose of the Social Security Act, it must be
applied to the collection of federal unemployment compensation taxes.
682. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 333 U.S. at 620 n.13; see also supra
notes 486-520 and accompanying text. This was one of only two 5-4 decisions
concerning the Priority Statute. The other 5-4 decision was in Emory, 314
U.S. 423; see also supra notes 369-387 and accompanying text.
683. Massachusetts, 333 U.S. at 634-35. Justice Robert Jackson stridently
objected. Id. at 635; see also supra notes 516-520 and accompanying text.
684. Nathanson, 344 U.S. at 28. As long as the government receives the
money collected, it does not matter if subsequently it shares some of that
money with third persons. McClellan, 364 U.S. at 451-52.
685. See Nathanson, 344 U.S. at 28 (explaining that monies may be collected
for third parties when they are declared wards of the state (citing Bramwell,
269 U.S at 483)).
686. Marshall v. People of State of New York, 254 U.S. 380, 381-82 (1920).
687. Campbell, 329 U.S. at 371; Field, 34 U.S. at 201.
688. Even though the primary focus of this article has been on United States
Supreme Court decisions, it should not be overlooked that there is substantial
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Identity of the United States

A question has arisen as to just who (or what) is the United
States. The Court has opined that the United States may include
the many administrative agencies which do not have an identity
separate and apart from this union of states. 6 9 The Farm Credit
Administration is one such agency."'
The Small Business
Administration is another.691 A claim may be filed in the name of
the agency or its head and be entitled to priority.692
F. Applicability to Debtors Generally
The statute applies to debtors, generally;69 it does not matter
if the debt originated as part of a foreign contract. 694 The form of
the debt is immaterial; 99 it might be legal or equitable, the debtors
may be joint or several, principals or sureties." A large number of
debts have been for the collection of taxes 697
.
G. A Liberal Interpretation
Priority statutes should not be given a narrow interpretation,
but rather a liberal one; one which is fair and reasonable according
to the just interpretation of its terms.698

state court jurisprudence interpreting the federal Priority Statute. See, e.g.,
Community Progress, Inc. v. White, 444 A.2d 1369 (Conn. 1982); In re
Berretta's Estate, 426 A.2d 1098 (Pa. 1981).
689. See Remund, 330 U.S. at 541.
690. Id. at 540.
691. McClellan, 364 U.S. at 450.
692. Remund, 330 U.S. at 542.
693. Fisher, 6 U.S. at 395. From the beginning, the title of the Act has not
restricted its coverage. Id. at 386. That is to say that the language of the
statute is "general and not qualified." Lewis, 92 U.S. at 624.
694. Harrison,9 U.S. at 298.
695. Bayne, 92 U.S. at 643.
696. Lewis, 92 U.S. at 624.
697. See generally Estate of Romani, 523 U.S. 517 (seeking to establish that
tax liens take priority over judgment liens); Key, 397 U.S. 322 (seeking
payment of federal tax claims); Massachusetts, 333 U.S. 611 (seeking federal
insurance contribution taxes under Title 8 and unemployment compensation
taxes under Title 9 of the Social Security Act); Waddill, Holland & Flinn, 323
U.S. 353 (seeking payment of federal taxes prior to state taxes); Texas, 314
U.S. 480 (seeking payment of federal gasoline taxes); Maclay, 288 U.S. 290
(seeking payment of corporate taxes); County of Spokane, 279 U.S. 80 (seeking
payment of income taxes); Stripe, 269 U.S. 503 (seeking payment of corporate
taxes); Price, 269 U.S. 492 (seeking payment of income taxes).
698. Beaston, 37 U.S. at 134; Bramwell, 269 U.S. at 492; Marxen, 307 U.S. at
206; Moore, 423 U.S. at 85, 86; State Bank of North Carolina,31 U.S. at 35.
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H. Liens Not Created
Priority statutes do not create a lien in favor of the sovereign,
but only a priority for payment699 from the general funds of the
debtor held by the assignee of the assignment.7 0 The priority is
not a right which overrides and supersedes the assignment to
prevent the debtor's property from passing by virtue thereof; it is
merely a right to prior payment. °1 In other words, the United
States remains an unsecured creditor. All it has under the statute
is first call against the property of the debtor.0 2 If the United
States is a secured creditor, by virtue of having taken collateral, it
does not lose its right of priority,' 3 and is not required to pursue
collateral. 7°
I.

Exceptions to the Priority Statute

There are exceptions to the Priority Statute. For example,
where another statute reflects remedial attention to a certain class
of debtors that is in conflict with the objectives of the Priority
Statute, which is merely to allow the United States to collect
money, the latter has been held inapplicable.7 5 On the other hand,
as stated above,'
where the opposing statute is specific in
protecting certain creditors, the Priority Statute, which has been
described as "general and comprehensive," will be applied rather
than the more specifically structured one.7 7 The Supreme Court
has emphasized that "loinly the plainest inconsistency would
warrant our finding an implied exception to the operation of so

699.
700.
701.
702.

Beaston, 37 U.S. at 133; Hooe, 7 U.S. at 91; Fisher,6 U.S. at 396-97.
Hack, 33 U.S. at 275.
Conard, 26 U.S. at 386.
Knott, 298 U.S. at 552. As such, however, it may assert its priority in

any jurisdiction where property of the insolvent debtor can be found. Id. at
552.
703. Lewis, 92 U.S. at 623.

704. Id.
705. See Mellon, 271 U.S. at 237-38 (holding that the Director General of
Railroads, who operated railroads during this country's engagement in
hostilities and was given the same privileges and duties of railroads in

general, was not permitted to utilize the Priority Statute in collecting the
debts of railroads). However, The purpose of the Transportation Act of 1920
was to promote the general status of railroads, and it provided that railroads
furnish adequate security for the payment of their loans. See § 439, Pub. L.
No. 152, ch. 91, 41 stat. 456, 494 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
49 U.S.C. (2000)). But the Court in Guaranty Trust Co., could see no reason

why the United States needed an additional method of collection. 280 U.S. at
485. Indeed, it has been judicially determined that there is no conflict
between the Priority Statute and the statute which gave financial aid to
farmers during the Depression. Remund, 330 U.S. at 544.
706. See supra notes 208, 209 and accompanying text.
707. Cook County Nat'l Bank, 107 U.S. at 451.
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clear a command as that of § 3466."7°8 If there are third parties
who have a prior interest in the property, the United States might
be primed out of its otherwise favorable position. If a third party's
lien reveals the identity of the lienor, the amount of the lien, and
the property to which the lien attaches, the lien will prime the
United States' priority."' In such case the lien will be described as
"specific and perfected,"71 ° or "specific and ascertainable,"71' or
"explicit and perfected,"7 2 or that the lien has "specificity."713 In
such cases the lien will prime the United States' priority. On the
other hand, if the third party's lien is not perfected, the priority of
the United States will prevail. 75" The interpretation of state law by
state courts is binding on federal courts; the question of whether a
lien has been perfected so as to prime the priority of the United
States, however, is a federal question. 6 Hence, a state court's
characterization of a lien as "specific and perfected" cannot operate
by itself to impair or supersede a long-standing Congressional
declaration of policy.7"7
On the other hand, a state's
characterization of a lien as "inchoate" is "practically conclusive."718
J.

Insolvency of Debtor

It has been clearly stated that without insolvency on the part
of the debtor there will be no priority accorded the United States. 9

708. Emory, 314 U.S. at 433; Moore, 423 U.S. at 82; McClellan, 364 U.S. at
453; Remund, 330 U.S. at 544-45; Illinois ex rel. Gordon, 328 U.S. at 11 (1946).
It was held in Emory, that the National Housing Act did not alter the priority
of the United States under the Priority Statute. 314 U.S. at 430. The Court in
McClellan held that even if it were a fact that giving priority to the Small
Business Administration in the collection of its debts would make it more
difficult for small businessmen to borrow money, it was not within the
"plainest inconsistency" category referred to in Emory. 364 U.S. at 453.
709. Campbell, 329 U.S. at 375. The recording of a lien does not perfect it
when the lienor does not know the amount owed by the debtor or the type of
property owned by the debtor. Id. at 373.
710. Waddill, Holland & Flinn, 323 U.S. at 357.
711. Id. at 358.
712. Id. at 360.
713. GilbertAssociates, 345 U.S. at 366.
714. Estate of Romani, 523 U.S. at 532.
715. Security Trust, 340 U.S. at 51; Texas, 314 U.S. at 486, 87; County of
Spokane, 279 U.S. at 93. In Maclay, a state lien for taxes, due but not
determined in amount until after a receiver had been appointed, was not able
to prime the Priority Statute as it was said to be just a caveat of something
more to come. 288 U.S. at 291-92.
716. Security Trust, 340 U.S. at 49; Campbell, 329 U.S. at 371.
717. Waddill, Holland & Flinn, 323 U.S. at 357-60; Campbell, 329 U.S. at
371.
718. Campbell, 329 U.S. at 371.
719. Vermont, 377 U.S. at 358; City of New Britain, 347 U.S. at 85. Where
the debtor is solvent the "first in time is first in right" rule applies to a claim of
the United States against its debtors. Id. at 85.
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It has been opined that insolvency means the debtor does not have
sufficient property with which to pay all debts owed.72 ° The
debtor's insolvency must be established by a notorious act of the
debtor pursuant to law."' A determination of whether the debtor
is insolvent is made from the facts, not from the pleadings.722 For
the statute to apply, the debtor need not be in bankruptcy, merely
insolvent. In fact, if the debtor is in bankruptcy the Priority
Statute will not apply.7 23 If a debtor of the United States is the
subject of a bankruptcy case, in order for the United States' debt to
be satisfied the government will have to file a claim in bankruptcy
as either a secured or unsecured claim-holder. It will be assigned
priority pursuant to the terms of the Bankruptcy Act, not the
Priority Act.
K

Assignment ForBenefit of Creditors

In order for the United States to have priority, the debtor,
while insolvent, must have made a voluntary assignment of its
property for the benefit of its creditors. Several rules have been
pronounced in connection with that requirement. It has been
opined that this means that all of the debtor's property must be
assigned.2 The person to whom the assignment has been made is
called an "assignee" or "trustee." A trustee in bankruptcy will
qualify as such an "assignee" or "trustee".7" If an assignment is
made, the costs of administering the assignment is deducted from
the money paid to the United States.2 The priority of the United
States attaches to the property of the debtor, real or personal, or
its proceeds or product because that is the source from which the
claim may be satisfied.727 If the debtor has no property at the time

720. Hooe, 7 U.S. at 91. In order for the Priority Statute to apply an
assignment must be made, even though the debtor may be unable to pay its
debts. Beaston, 37 U.S. at 133.
721. Prince, 12 U.S. at 434. That a debtor's insolvency must be established
by a "notorious act... pursuant to law" must mean according to the Priority

Statute. Id.
722. Butterworth, 269 U.S. at 513.
723. 31 U.S.C. § 3713(a)(2) specifically provides that "[tihis subsection does

not apply to a case under title 11." Before the Priority Statute was amended
to include this provision it did apply to bankruptcy cases, but there was no
requirement that the debtor be in bankruptcy. Bramwell, 269 U.S. at 530.
724. Hooe, 7 U.S. at 91.
725. Lewis, 92 U.S. at 624.
726. Hunter, 30 U.S. at 439.
727. The intricacies of property ownership are of vital significance here. In
Hack, one partner of a partnership was a debtor of the United States. 33 U.S.
at 274-75.
The government argued that its priority should reach that
partner's interest in the partnership property. The Court ruled that only if
the total value of all partnership property exceeded the amount of partnership
debts would the partnership property be available to satisfy the claim of the

United States.
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the priority arises there is nothing to which the priority can
attach.72 If a receiver has been appointed for the debtor's property
and the receiver converts the property to cash in order to pay
claims, the Court in one case has likened those proceeds to a trust
fund (i.e. no longer belonging to the debtor any more than a trust
corpus would belong to the settlor of the trust).729 No evidence of
insolvency may be received unless the debtor has been divested of
its property.7"'
The requirement that the assignment be
"voluntary" has been given a somewhat unusual interpretation. In
one case, a foundering bank was required, under state banking
laws, to turn over its property to a Banking Commissioner. The
Court held that though the debtor, a bank, was required to do so
under state law, its turn-over met the provisions of the Priority
Statute because the purpose of the turn-over was to convert the
property into cash for the payment of the bank's debts."'
L. Attachment of Debtor's Property
In order for the United States to have priority, the debtor,
while insolvent and absent, must have had his property
attached.7 2 We assume the word "attached" refers to a procedure
in which the property is taken into custodia legis, because in one
case 7' the Court found that an attachment lien which was
"contingent or inchoate - merely a lis pendens notice that a right
to perfect a lien exists,"7 ' was insufficient authority for the
invocation of the Priority Statute. The attachment must take the
property out of the debtor's ownership.
M. The Time of Acquisition of United States' Priority
As we have seen, under the Priority Statute the priority of the
United States arises upon the happening of one of three events: an

728. If the priority of the United States would otherwise attach, but the
debtor possesses no property because it has been levied upon, or the debtor
had previously made a bona fide conveyance of his interest in the property to a
third person, or mortgaged the same to secure a debt (applicable in a "title"

state), the property cannot be made subject to the preferred position of the
United States because the debtor has been divested of it. Thelusson, 15 U.S.
at 426; Fisher,6 U.S. at 395.
729. See Cook County Nat'l Bank, 107 U.S. at 452 (denying the government's
attempt to impose its preference upon the proceeds of a receiver's sale because

a trustee may not set-off debts owed him by the trust's Settlor against trust
property).
730. Beaston, 37 U.S. at 133.
731. Bramwell, 269 U.S. at 491.
732. Alternatively, the debtor must have made an assignment of its property
or it must have committed an "act of bankruptcy."
733. Security Trust Say. Bank, 340 U.S. at 50.

734. Id.
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A.B.C.,7' an attachment of the debtor's property while the debtor
is absent, or the committing by the debtor of an "act of
bankruptcy," while the debtor is insolvent. The Court has slightly
modified this conclusion by ruling that the priority may arise at
another time - the date of the appointment of a receiver." 6 A
arose on the date the debtor loses
later decision said that priority
37
property.
his
over
control
N. The Importance of Equity
Though the Priority Statute does not specifically require it,
the Court has held in several cases that rules of equity apply to
the attempted invocation of the statute. The government may not
successfully assert priority against another creditor whose position
Even though an
is based on contract and good conscience."
opposing creditor has been denied the remedy of collecting on his
cause of action because of the running of the statute of limitations,
as long as the debt remains unpaid, and the opposing creditor's
position is otherwise perfected, the running of the statute bars
only the remedy but not the cause of action; therefore, default will
prevent the U.S. from becoming a preferred creditor unless the
creditor transfers his interest.7 3 9 When, however, the Priority
Statute abolished a rule of equity as to the payment of debt, which
was later adopted by the Bankruptcy Act, the method of the
Priority Statute prevailed over the method previously adopted by
the Bankruptcy Act. 4 °
0.

Liability of Person Who Ignores the Statute

There is a scarcity of law pertaining to 31 U.S.C. § 3713(b)
and the liability of a representative of a person or an estate (except
a trustee acting under title 11) paying any part of a debt of the
person or estate before paying a claim of the Government. 4 31

735. See supra note 12.
736. See Campbell, 329 U.S. at 373 n.14 (citing Oklahoma, 261 U.S. at 260,
and Spokane, 279 U.S. at 93). As a matter of fact, the decision in Oklahoma
did not say whether the priority arose upon the appointment of the Receiver,
or upon the Receiver's taking over the debtor's property. It would seem that
the Court in Oklahoma was correct because, even though a Receiver's taking
over the debtor's property is not an A.B.C. it is closer to that procedure than
the Receiver's appointment, which could be accomplished considerably in
advance of the debtor being divested of its property. The Court in Campbell
also stated that the appointment of a Receiver can be the first step in the
perfection of a lien. 329 U.S. at 374.
737. Massachusetts, 333 U.S. at 617 n.8 (citing Campbell, 329 U.S. 362,
Waddill, Holland & Flinn,Inc., 28 S.E.2d 741, and Oklahoma 261 U.S. 253).
738. Brent, 35 U.S. at 615.
739. Id. at 617.
740. Lewis, 92 U.S. at 624.
741. See Smythe, 188 U.S. at 177 (affirming, in dictum, that a judgment in
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U.S.C. § 3713(a) and 31 U.S.C. § 3713(b) must be considered in
7
pari materia.
" A "distribution agent" in a Chapter XI case under
the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 was held personally liable under 31
U.S.C. § 192, the precursor of 31 U.S.C. § 3713(b)." In that case,
the distribution agent, the president of the bankrupt corporation
was aware of the United States' claim; took an active role in the
formulation of the plan, which contained at least a reference to the
Government's claim; was present at the confirmation hearing at
which the claim was discussed; and, was one of the major
distributees under the Plan.'"
M

P.

The Priority Statute is Applicable to Taxes

Prior to the 1982 amendment of the Priority Statute, which
changed the word "debts" to "claims," 45 the Supreme Court had
ruled that the Statute was applicable to taxes. 46 The 1982
amendment did not change that ruling. The present Bankruptcy
Act defines "debt" as liability on a claim. 4 ' "Claim" is defined as a
right to payment or a right to an equitable remedy for breach of
performance if such breach gives rise to a right to payment.7 "
Therefore, taxes due qualify as a claim under both the Bankruptcy
Act and the Priority Statute.

VII. A FINAL NOTE
A definitive work about the Priority Statute, a little-known
but important part of our jurisprudence, is long overdue.
Hopefully this article has met that need.

such a case would be "interpreted and enforced" according to the Priority
Statute). When the debtor is divested of its property "the person who becomes
invested with title is thereby made a trustee for the United States, and is
bound to pay debt first out of the proceeds of the debtor's property." Beaston,
37 U.S. at 133-34.
742. Security Tr. Sav. Bank, 340 U.S. at 50; see also King, 379 U.S. at 336-38
(discussing 31 U.S.C. §§ 191-92, the precursors of 31 U.S.C. §§ 3713(a)-(b)).
743. King, 379 U.S. at 339-40.
744. Id. An honest belief that there were sufficient funds available for
payment of the government's claim will not save the trustee from liability. Id.
745. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
746. Stripe, 269 U.S. at 503; Price, 269 U.S. at 499.
747. 11 U.S.C. § 101(12).
748. 11 U.S.C. § 101(5).
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Chief Justice William Howard Taft
Justice Willis Van Devanter
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes
Justice James C. McReynolds
Justice Louis D. Brandeis
Justice Pierce Butler
Justice George Surtherland
Justice Harlan F. Stone
Justice Edward T. Sanford
Price v. United States, 269 U.S. 492 (1926)
Chief Justice William Howard Taft
Justice Willis Van Devanter
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes
Justice James C. McReynolds
Justice Louis D. Brandeis
Justice Pierce Butler
Justice George Surtherland
Justice Harlan F. Stone
Justice Edward T. Sanford
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Stripe v. United States, 269 U.S. 503 (1926)
Chief Justice William Howard Taft
Justice Willis Van Devanter
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes
Justice James C. McReynolds
Justice Louis D. Brandeis
Justice Pierce Butler
Justice George Surtherland
Justice Harlan F. Stone
Justice Edward T. Sanford
United States v. Butterworth-JudsonCorp., 269 U.S. 504 (1926)
Chief Justice William Howard Taft
Justice Willis Van Devanter
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes
Justice James C. McReynolds
Justice Louis D. Brandeis
Justice Pierce Butler
Justice George Surtherland
Justice Harlan F. Stone
Justice Edward T. Sanford
Mellon v. Michigan Trust Co., 271 U.S. 236 (1926)
Chief Justice William Howard Taft
Justice Willis Van Devanter
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes
Justice James C. McReynolds
Justice Louis D. Brandeis
Justice Pierce Butler
Justice George Surtherland
Justice Harlan F. Stone
Justice Edward T. Sanford
County of Spokane v. United States, 279 U.S. 80 (1929)
Chief Justice William Howard Taft
Justice Willis Van Devanter
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes
Justice James C. McReynolds
Justice Louis D. Brandeis
Justice Pierce Butler
Justice George Surtherland
Justice Harlan F. Stone
Justice Edward T. Sanford
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United States v. Guaranty Trust Co. of NewYork, 280 U.S. 478
(1930)
Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes
Justice Willis Van Devanter
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes
Justice James C. McReynolds
Justice Louis D. Brandeis
Justice Pierce Butler
Justice George Surtherland
Justice Harlan F. Stone
Justice Owen J. Roberts
New York v. Maclay, 288 U.S. 290 (1933)
Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes
Justice Willis Van Devanter
Justice Benjamin N. Cardozo
Justice James C. McReynolds
Justice Louis D. Brandeis
Justice Pierce Butler
Justice George Surtherland
Justice Harlan F. Stone
Justice Owen J. Roberts
United States v. Knott, 298 U.S. 544 (1936)
Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes
Justice Willis Van Devanter
Justice Benjamin N. Cardozo
Justice James C. McReynolds
Justice Louis D. Brandeis
Justice Pierce Butler
Justice George Surtherland
Justice Harlan F. Stone
Justice Owen J. Roberts
United States v. Marxen, 307 U.S. 200 (1939)
Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes
Justice Hugo Black
Justice Felix Frankfurter
Justice James C. McReynolds
Justice William 0. Douglas
Justice Pierce Butler
Justice Stanley F. Reed
Justice Harlan F. Stone
Justice Owen J. Roberts
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United States v. Emory, 314 U.S. 423 (1941)
Chief Justice Harlan F. Stone
Justice Hugo Black
Justice Felix Frankfurter
Justice James F. Byrnes
Justice William 0. Douglas
Justice Frank Murphy
Justice Stanley F. Reed
Justice Robert H. Jackson
Justice Owen J. Roberts
United States v. Texas, 324 U.S. 480 (1941)
Chief Justice Harlan F. Stone
Justice Hugo Black
Justice Felix Frankfurter
Justice James F. Byrnes
Justice William 0. Douglas
Justice Frank Murphy
Justice Stanley F. Reed
Justice Robert H. Jackson
Justice Owen J. Roberts
United States v. Waddill, Holland & Flinn, Inc., 323 U.S. 353
(1945)
Chief Justice Harlan F. Stone
Justice Hugo Black
Justice Felix Frankfurter
Justice Wiley R. Rutledge
Justice William 0. Douglas
Justice Frank Murphy
Justice Stanley F. Reed
Justice Robert H. Jackson
Justice Harold H. Burton
Illinois ex rel. Gordon v. United States, 328 U.S. 8 (1946)
Chief Justice Fred M. Vinson
Justice Hugo Black
Justice Felix Frankfurter
Justice Wiley R. Rutledge
Justice William 0. Douglas
Justice Frank Murphy
Justice Stanley F. Reed
Justice Robert H. Jackson
Justice Harold H. Burton
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Illinois ex rel. Gordon v. Campbell, 329 U.S. 362 (1946)
Chief Justice Fred M. Vinson
Justice Hugo Black
Justice Felix Frankfurter
Justice Wiley R. Rutledge
Justice William 0. Douglas
Justice Frank Murphy
Justice Stanley F. Reed
Justice Robert H. Jackson
Justice Harold H. Burton
U.S. Dept of Agriculture v. Remund, 330 U.S. 539 (1947)
Chief Justice Fred M. Vinson
Justice Hugo Black
Justice Felix Frankfurter
Justice Wiley R. Rutledge
Justice William 0. Douglas
Justice Frank Murphy
Justice Stanley F. Reed
Justice Robert H. Jackson
Justice Harold H. Burton
Massachusetts v. United States, 333 U.S. 611 (1948)
Chief Justice Fred M. Vinson
Justice Hugo Black
Justice Felix Frankfurter
Justice Sherman Minton
Justice William 0. Douglas
Justice Tom C. Clark
Justice Stanley F. Reed
Justice Robert H. Jackson
Justice Harold H. Burton
United States v. Security Trust & Savings Bank, 340 U.S. 47
(1950)
Chief Justice Fred M. Vinson
Justice Hugo Black
Justice Felix Frankfurter
Justice Sherman Minton
Justice William 0. Douglas
Justice Tom C. Clark
Justice Stanley F. Reed
Justice Robert H. Jackson
Justice Harold H. Burton
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Nathanson v. N.L.R.B., 344 U.S. 25 (1952)
Chief Justice Fred M. Vinson
Justice Hugo Black
Justice Felix Frankfurter
Justice Sherman Minton
Justice William 0. Douglas
Justice Tom C. Clark
Justice Stanley F. Reed
Justice Robert H. Jackson
Justice Harold H. Burton
United States v. Gilbert Associates, 345 U.S. 361 (1953)
Chief Justice Earl Warren
Justice Hugo Black
Justice Felix Frankfurter
Justice Sherman Minton
Justice William 0. Douglas
Justice Tom C. Clark
Justice Stanley F. Reed
Justice Robert H. Jackson
Justice Harold H. Burton
United States v. City of New Britain,347 U.S. 81 (1954)
Chief Justice Earl Warren
Justice Hugo Black
Justice Felix Frankfurter
Justice Sherman Minton
Justice William 0. Douglas
Justice Tom C. Clark
Justice Stanley F. Reed
Justice Robert H. Jackson
Justice Harold H. Burton
Small Business Administration v. McClellan, 364 U.S. 446 (1960)
Chief Justice Earl Warren
Justice Hugo Black
Justice Felix Frankfurter
Justice William J. Brennan
Justice William 0. Douglas
Justice Ton C. Clark
Justice Charles E. Whitaker
Justice John M. Harlan
Justice Potter Stewart
United States v. Vermont, 377 U.S. 351 (1964)
Chief Justice Earl Warren
Justice Hugo Black
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Justice
Justice
Justice
Justice
Justice
Justice
Justice

Abe Fortas
William J. Brennan
William 0. Douglas
Thurgood Marshall
Byron H. White
John M. Harlan
Potter Stewart

King v. United States, 379 U.S. 329 (1964)

Chief Justice Earl Warren
Justice Hugo Black
Justice Abe Fortas
Justice William J. Brennan
Justice William 0. Douglas
Justice Thurgood Marshall
Justice Byron H. White
Justice John M. Harlan
Justice Potter Stewart
United States v. Key, 397 U.S. 322 (1970)

Chief Justice Warren E. Burger
Justice Hugo Black
Justice Harry A. Blackmun
Justice William J. Brennan
Justice William 0. Douglas
Justice Thurgood Marshall
Justice Byron H. White
Justice John M. Harlan
Justice Potter Stewart
United States v. Moore, 423 U.S. 77 (1975)

Chief Justice Warren E. Burger
Justice Lewis F. Powell
Justice Harry A. Blackmun
Justice William J. Brennan
Justice John Paul Stevens
Justice Thurgood Marshall
Justice Byron H. White
Justice William H. Rehnquist
Justice Potter Stewart
United States v. Estate of Romani, 523 U.S. 517 (1998)

Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist
Justice Anthony M. Kennedy
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg
Justice David H. Souter
Justice John Paul Stevens
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Justice
Justice
Justice
Justice

Clarence Thomas
Steven G. Breyer
Antonin Scalia
Sandra Day O'Connor
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